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Pricing Plastics Pollution: Lessons from Three
Decades of Climate Policy
JONAS J. MONAST & JOHN VIRDIN
Plastic is now the most widely used human-made substance on the planet,
and plastics pollution impacts marine and coastal ecosystems, local
economies, and human health. Local and national governments are
increasingly responding by banning plastic bags and other specific plastic
products, taxing the use of certain plastics, and improving waste management
and recycling. These are important steps, but alone they will not result in a
meaningful reduction in cumulative plastics pollution or encourage
development of sufficient alternatives to plastic. Additional policy measures
are necessary.
This Article argues that climate change and plastic pollution share
numerous similarities, and these similarities allow policymakers to benefit
from the three decades of climate policy experimentation when choosing
plastics pollution policy instruments. Both are collective action problems
with local, national, and global impacts. Unilateral policies will do little to
address total accumulation of the pollutant. There are countless sources of
plastics pollution and the plastics have different uses and characteristics.
Technological breakthroughs are necessary to recycle and reuse large
amounts of plastics or reduce carbon pollution. There are influential,
established interests in value chains that produce and use plastics or fuels
that emit greenhouse gases.
The Article focuses on one key policy instrument in climate policies—pollution
pricing—and identifies lessons from carbon pricing that can inform the design
of plastics pollution policies. The Article begins by summarizing the global
impacts of plastics pollution and the current international, national, and
subnational plastics pollution policies. It then argues that broader market-based
approaches can help address the global challenge of plastics pollution, identifies
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policy design choices for market-based pollution policies, elaborates on the
similarities between plastics pollution and climate change, and then describes
lessons from climate policy that can inform the design of plastics policies. The
Article concludes by describing the applicability of these lessons from climate
change to the emerging policy response to plastic pollution.
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Pricing Plastics Pollution: Lessons from Three
Decades of Climate Policy
JONAS J. MONAST * & JOHN VIRDIN **
INTRODUCTION
Plastic is now the most widely used human-made substance on the planet.1
An estimated 8.3 billion tons of plastics have been produced worldwide,
resulting in an estimated 6.3 billion tons of plastic waste.2 The vast majority
of the waste is disposed of in landfills or discarded into the natural
environment.3 A recent study estimates that 1.3 billion tons of plastics will
pollute land and oceans by 2040 unless there is a global response.4
Plastics pollution is a global collective action problem with local,
national, and international implications.5 Pollution impacts marine and
coastal ecosystems, local economies, and human health.6 Local and national
governments are increasingly responding by banning plastic bags and other
*
C. Boyden Gray Distinguished Fellow and Assistant Professor, University of North Carolina
School of Law.
**
Director, Oceans & Coastal Policy Program, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy
Solutions and Adjunct Assistant Professor, Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University.
1
Boris Worm et al., Plastic as a Persistent Marine Pollutant, 42 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RES. 1, 2
(2017) (“[P]lastics are now the most widely used man-made substances and have become omnipresent
in every aspect of our lives.”).
2
Roland Geyer, Jenna R. Jambeck & Kara Lavender Law, Production, Use, and Fate of All Plastics
Ever Made, 3 SCI. ADVANCES, July 19, 2017, at 1, 1, https://www.science.org/doi/epdf/10.1126/sciadv.
1700782. To put the amount of plastics in perspective, the BBC estimates that “8.3 billion tonnes is as
heavy as 25,000 Empire State Buildings . . . or a billion elephants.” Jonathan Amos, Earth Is Becoming
‘Planet Plastic’, BBC (July 19, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-40654915.
3
Amos, supra note 2.
4
Victoria Gill, Plastic Pollution to Weigh 1.3 Billion Tonnes by 2040, BBC (July 23, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-53521001. See also Winnie W. Y. Lau et al.,
Evaluating Scenarios Toward Zero Plastic Pollution, 369 SCI., Sept. 18, 2020, at 1, 1,
https://www.science.org/doi/pdf/10.1126/science.aba9475?casa_token=DGmYm9m4Ef8AAAAA:bEF
nJdjv1YJi0Izr5vQxNhJZLI0ne1JBrp_8ZEIKTf4xF6Zxtyvhroy3OhjAKdIUU41hieLQY1NtT-E (stating
that, “[i]f plastic production and waste generation continue to grow at current rates, the annual mass of
mismanaged waste has been projected to more than double by 2050”). Pollution is a shared problem
where rational individual decisions lead to collective outcomes that are sub-optimal or, in economic
terms, a market failure. Peter Kollock, Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 ANN. REV.
SOCIO. 183, 183 (1998).
5
Nicola J. Beaumont et al., Global Ecological, Social and Economic Impacts of Marine Plastic, 142
MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 189, 189 (2019) (“The impact of marine plastic is . . . a global issue . . . .”).
6
See Philip J. Landrigan et al., Human Health and Ocean Pollution, 86 ANNALS GLOB. HEALTH
151, 152 (2020) (presenting research findings on the effects of pollution on the environment, ecosystem,
and human health).
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specific plastic products, taxing the use of certain plastic products, and
improving waste management and recycling.7 In 2019, almost all countries
agreed to a first international step to limit plastic waste by adding plastic
waste to the Basel Convention that limits the international transfer of certain
types of hazardous waste.8 Current local and national policies are important
steps, but alone they will not result in a meaningful reduction in cumulative
plastics pollution or encourage development of sufficient alternatives to
plastic.9 Additional policy measures are necessary.
This Article focuses on one key policy instrument to combat plastic
pollution—pollution pricing—and identifies lessons that can inform the
design of policy responses. Pollution pricing requires firms to internalize the
social and environmental impacts of pollution via taxes, levies, fees, or
cap-and-trade programs. Depending on the price, market-based policies can
shift market dynamics in favor of less polluting alternatives, incentivize
behavior changes, and generate revenue for policymakers to invest in
technology innovation or mitigation.10 They can also allow multiple
jurisdictions to link their policies, resulting in a broader scope without
requiring multilateral agreement before taking action.11
To date, policymakers have used economic instruments such as
pollution pricing in limited circumstances, largely in the form of fees or
taxes to combat pollution from plastic carrier bags. These policies typically
do not set the price based on estimated social cost; rather, they impose a
relatively small fee that may serve as nudges to influence consumer behavior
but do little to reduce the volume of plastics pollution. Although regulatory
bans are far more prevalent, an increasing number of local and national
governments are proposing pollution taxes.12

7
Giulia Carlini & Konstantin Kleine, Advancing the International Regulation of Plastic Pollution
Beyond the United Nations Environment Assembly Resolution on Marine Litter and Microplastics, 27
REV. EUR. COMPAR. & INT’L ENV’T L. 234, 234–35 (2018); Dirk Xanthos & Tony R. Walker,
International Policies to Reduce Plastic Marine Pollution from Single-Use Plastics (Plastic Bags and
Microbeads): A Review, 118 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 17, 17–21 (2017).
8
Overview, BASEL CONVENTION, http://www.basel.int/Implementation/MarinePlasticLitterandMi
croplastics/Overview/tabid/6068/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2021).
9
KAREN RAUBENHEIMER & NIKO URHO, POSSIBLE ELEMENTS OF A NEW GLOBAL AGREEMENT TO
PREVENT PLASTIC POLLUTION 9 (2020), https://pub.norden.org/temanord2020-535/temanord2020535.pdf (calling for “a global response that extends beyond waste management to address the entire life
cycle of plastic pollution” because “[a] business-as-usual approach that does not address current
governance gaps is harmful to ecosystems and the services they provide, as well as harmful to social
well-being and economic productivity in multiple sectors”).
10
Jonas Monast, From Top-Down to Bottom-Up Climate Policy: New Challenges in Carbon
Market Design, 8 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 175, 180 (2017).
11
Id.
12
See Francisco Alpizar et al., A Framework for Selecting and Designing Policies to Reduce Marine
Plastic Pollution in Developing Countries, 109 ENV’T SCI. & POL’Y 25, 27–29 (2020) (surveying
international plastics pollution policies).
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Designing effective national or international pricing policies for plastics
pollution requires multiple regulatory choices, such as deciding what is
subject to the price, where in the value chain to apply the price, and what
pricing instrument to use. Because there is limited experience with plastics
pollution pricing beyond fees or taxes on single-use bags, policymakers
interested in designing a market-based policy to limit plastics pollution must
look to other pollution pricing regimes for models to help guide policy
design. Here, climate policy can serve as a model for considering market
design options and tradeoffs. Markets and pricing instruments have played
a central role in the three-decade effort to develop effective national and
international greenhouse gas (GHG) policies.13
Like plastics pollution, climate change is a global problem with
planetary-scale effects.14 Unilateral policies will do little to address total
accumulation of the pollutants. Both problems arise from multiple and
diffuse types and sources of pollutants, with different characteristics and
damage curves, and heterogenous abatement costs. There are countless
sources of plastics pollution, and the plastics have different uses and
characteristics. Most sectors of the economy are responsible for major
emissions and are increasingly dependent upon plastics for packaging and
products, as well as GHG-emitting fossil fuels for energy. GHG emissions
are pervasive throughout the global economy.15 Different GHGs have
different heat trapping potential and persist in the atmosphere for different
periods of time.16 Climate policies may focus on all pollutants, some
pollutants (usually carbon dioxide (CO2)), some sectors, or some regions.17
13

See Monast, supra note 10, at 180 (citing U.S. and international emissions trading programs).
Jonathan B. Wiener, Property and Prices to Protect the Planet, 19 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L.
515, 516 (2009).
15
See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY: GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (July 27, 2021)
(summarizing emission impacts from different sectors of the U.S. economy). Sources of GHG emissions
range from major emitters, such as industrial facilities, power plants, and oil and natural gas extraction,
to smaller emitters, such as individual motor vehicles and gas-fired appliances. Id.
16
A molecule of carbon dioxide (CO2), the most prevalent GHG, has relatively minor heat trapping
potential compared to other GHGs, but it persists in the atmosphere for over a century. See Understanding
Global Warming Potentials, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY: GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-potentials (Sept. 9, 2020) (comparing
the heat-trapping potential of different GHGs). Methane, by contrast, has approximately twenty-five
times the heat trapping potential of CO2, but it only lasts in the atmosphere for about ten years.
Importance of Methane, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY: GLOB. METHANE INITIATIVE,
https://www.epa.gov/gmi/importance-methane (June 30, 2021); Greenhouse Gases, MIT C LIMATE
PORTAL, https://climate.mit.edu/explainers/greenhouse-gases (last visited Nov. 13, 2021).
17
See, e.g., Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified
Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824 (June 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (establishing GHG
emission standards for oil and gas wells); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600) (limiting GHG emissions from light-duty motor vehicles); see also
Cap-and-Trade Program: About, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/cap14
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Policies targeting multiple GHGs use the heat-trapping potential of CO2 to
develop a common metric for measuring compliance. Similarly, different
plastics serve different purposes, have different levels of recyclability and
reuse, and have different lifespans. Each of these types of plastics have
different characteristics and serve different purposes. As a result, reducing
plastic pollution and mitigating climate change are more complex than
targeting a single type of pollutant, product, or even economic sector.
The Article begins by summarizing the global impacts of plastics
pollution and the current international, national, and subnational plastics
pollution policies. It then argues that broader market-based approaches can
help address the global challenge of plastics pollution. This section identifies
policy design choices for market-based pollution policies before elaborating
on the similarities between plastics pollution and climate change and
exploring the lessons from climate policy that can inform the design of plastics
policies. The Article concludes by describing the applicability of these lessons
from climate change to the emerging policy response to plastic pollution.
I.THE GLOBAL PROBLEM OF PLASTICS POLLUTION
Worldwide plastics production has increased exponentially in recent
decades. Cumulatively, there were 7.8 billion tons of plastics produced
between 1950 and 2015, with half of this amount produced between 2002
and 2015.18 Production has increased from 2 million tons in 1950 to 380
million tons in 2015.19
Plastics are polymers synthesized from petrochemicals or, far less
frequently, from biomass raw materials. The resin is easily molded into a
large variety of different shapes and products, most of which are not
biodegradable.20 Common types of plastic resin include: polyethylene (PE),
used for packaging, carryout bags, film packaging, milk jugs, and detergent
and water bottles, among others; polypropylene (PP), used for carpet fibers,
automotive bumpers, appliances, drinking straws, bottle caps, and yogurt
containers, among others; and polyethylene terephthalate (PET), used for
food and beverage packaging, utensils, plates, disposable cups, plastic
tableware, food containers, and packaging foam (e.g., Styrofoam), among
others.21 Of these uses of plastic material, packaging is far and away the most
common, constituting an estimated 36% of global primary plastic production
and-trade-program/about (last visited Nov. 18, 2021) (detailing a statewide carbon market covering
approximately 80% of the state’s GHG emissions).
18
Geyer, Jambeck & Lavender Law, supra note 2, at 1; Worm et al., supra note 1, at 1.
19
Geyer, Jambeck & Lavender Law, supra note 2, at 1.
20
Worm et al., supra note 1, at 2; Geyer, Jambeck & Lavender Law, supra note 2, at 1.
21
RACHEL KARASIK ET AL., 20 YEARS OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE GLOBAL PLASTIC
POLLUTION PROBLEM: THE PLASTICS POLICY INVENTORY 127 (2020), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu
/publications/20-years-government-responses-global-plastic-pollution-problem.
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and 47% of the total global waste generated from primary plastics in 2015.22
This volume reflects a global shift from reusable to single-use containers.23
Annual plastic waste is expected to roughly track annual plastic resin
production. An influential 2015 study estimated that plastics constituted
approximately 11% of total global waste generated in 2010.24 This waste is
typically disposed of through either: (1) recycling or reprocessing
(accounting for 18% of non-fiber plastic waste in 2014), (2) thermal
incineration (accounting for 24% of non-fiber plastic waste in 2014), or (3)
managed systems such as sanitary landfills.25 Plastic “leakage” occurs when
plastic is not disposed of but left uncontained in the environment during any
stage of a product’s life cycle. Most commonly, plastics pollution results
from mismanagement of waste.26 This leakage or pollution into the
environment is often monitored by the size of the plastics, typically
categorized as either macroplastics (200 micrometers or greater in diameter)
or microplastics.27
Microplastics may be produced deliberately, such as plastic beads used
in personal care products, or they may result from larger plastic products
breaking down, such as rubber particles from tire abrasion.28 They are a
particular case of mis-managed plastic waste that may enter the environment
via wastewater, when personal care products containing microplastic beads
are applied, rinsed, and washed down the drain into a wastewater stream.
Due to their size, a portion of microplastics remain in the final effluent even
after treatment.29 Microplastics may also enter the environment at the plastic
production stage in the form of “pellets, spherules, granules, discs, etc.” that
leak from processing plants or during transport.30
Plastic leakage into the environment often enters waterways and ocean
and coastal ecosystems, where biophysical breakdown is slow and the

22

Geyer, Jambeck & Lavender Law, supra note 2, at tbl.S5.
Id. at 1.
24
Jenna R. Jambeck et al., Plastic Waste Inputs from Land into the Ocean, 347 SCI. 768, 770 (2015).
25
Geyer, Jambeck & Lavender Law, supra note 2, at 2–3.
26
Worm et al., supra note 1, at 5–6; Geyer, Jambeck & Lavender Law, supra note 2, at 3.
27
Worm et al., supra note 1, at 8, 15.
28
Richard C. Thompson, Microplastics in the Marine Environment: Sources, Consequences and
Solutions, in MARINE ANTHROPOGENIC LITTER 185, 185, 187 (Melanie Bergmann, Lars Gutow &
Michael Klages eds., 2015).
29
Jason P. McDevitt et al., Addressing the Issue of Microplastics in the Wake of the MicrobeadFree Waters Act—A New Standard Can Facilitate Improved Policy, 51 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 6611, 6612
(2017); David A. Strifling, The Microbead-Free Waters Act of 2015: Model for Future Environmental
Legislation, or Black Swan?, 32 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 151, 152, 155 (2016).
30
Aaron Lechner & David Ramler, The Discharge of Certain Amounts of Industrial Microplastic
from a Production Plant into the River Danube Is Permitted by the Austrian Legislation, 200 ENV’T
POLLUTION 159, 159 (2015).
23
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material persists, with relatively few feasible options for cleanup.31
Microplastics in particular, as a result of breakdown from larger plastic
products, are widespread in marine ecosystems.32 The volume of
mismanaged plastic waste entering the oceans from inland waterways,
wastewater outflows, and transport by wind or tides was first estimated to
be on the order of 4.8 to 12.7 million tons in 2010,33 and the total volume
entering all aquatic ecosystems (both freshwater and marine) was
subsequently estimated to be on the order of 19 to 23 million tons in 2016.34
Of the total plastic waste entering the oceans, the amount transported via
rivers is significant, and estimated to be on the order of 1.2 to 2.4 million
tons annually.35
The estimated total weight of plastic floating on the surface of the
world’s oceans is between 93,000 and 267,000 tons—an order of magnitude
lower than amounts estimated to enter marine ecosystems.36 One hypothesis
for this “missing plastic” was that most plastic entering the ocean settled
below the surface after a relatively short period.37 More recently, a
hypothesis to explain this missing plastic suggests that the shoreline is
capturing a major part, where an estimated two-thirds of the mass of buoyant
macroplastics entering the ocean since 1950 is stored (i.e., stranded, settled
and/or buried, in episodes of capturing and resurfacing).38
Single-use plastic packaging, commonly polyethylene used in food
packaging and designed for immediate disposal, is a major cause of global
plastics pollution.39 While the types of plastic products are diverse, “plastics’
largest market is packaging, an application whose growth was accelerated
by a global shift from reusable to single-use containers.”40 Packaging is by
far the largest use of plastics by volume and more than double the next most
31
Laurent Lebreton, Matthias Egger & Boyan Slat, A Global Mass Budget for Positively Buoyant
Macroplastic Debris in the Ocean, 9 SCI. REPS., Sept. 12, 2019, at 1, 1–2, 7, 9,
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-019-49413-5.pdf; Worm et al., supra note 1, at 2, 9–10.
32
Richard C. Thompson et al., Lost at Sea: Where Is All the Plastic?, 304 SCI. 838, 838 (2004).
33
Jambeck et al., supra note 24, at 768.
34
Stephanie B. Borrelle et al., Predicted Growth in Plastic Waste Exceeds Efforts to Mitigate
Plastic Pollution, 369 SCI., Sept. 18, 2020, at 1, 1, https://www.science.org/doi/pdf/10.1126/science.ab
a3656?casa_token=KsYTBpftkYYAAAAA:6zJuCpIwDDSuQwUbAbm42KBrh6hn1AW8WE4PTR5ySZoDwAcdJzlgV3bhlRUQJzeGizYmPPGssprAdY.
35
Laurent C.M. Lebreton et al., River Plastic Emissions to the World’s Oceans, 8 NATURE
COMMC’NS, June 7, 2017, at 1, 3, https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms15611.pdf.
36
Lebreton, Egger & Slat, supra note 31, at 8.
37
Albert A. Koelmans et al., All Is Not Lost: Deriving a Top-Down Mass Budget of Plastic at Sea,
12 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, Nov. 10, 2017, at 1, 1, 7–8, https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/17489326/aa9500/pdf.
38
Lebreton, Egger & Slat, supra note 31, at 23.
39
See Laura Parker, The World’s Plastic Pollution Crisis Explained, NAT’L G EOGRAPHIC (June 7,
2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/plastic-pollution (explaining the role of
single-use plastics in the global plastic pollution crisis).
40
Geyer, Jambeck & Lavender Law, supra note 2, at 1.
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common use (building and construction). In total, plastics packaging
accounted for 47% of the total global waste generated from primary plastics
that same year.42 The contribution to plastic waste volumes reflects a shift
over the last few decades from reusable containers to single-use plastic
packaging as a method for delivering products to customers, and has led
some environmental non-governmental organizations to call for large
consumer goods companies to reduce the number of plastic packaging items
they produce by 50% by 2025.43 A range of solutions has been proposed to
make progress towards such ambitious targets, all revolving around
strategies to produce less virgin plastic packaging, e.g., eliminating
packaging items, increasing reuse of packaging, and reducing the materials
circulating (i.e., recycling and composting).44 However, governments are
still experimenting with policy instruments to create requirements or
incentives for such solutions to plastic packaging pollution,45 and many laws
and regulations have focused solely on plastic carrier bags, typically
targeting the product and not the virgin plastic content.46
Projections about the future scale of global plastic pollution are
daunting. If global plastic production continues its exponential growth,
humanity will have produced 34 billion metric tons of plastics (including
resins, polyester polyamide and acrylic fibers, and additives) by the end of
2050, of which 12 billion tons would be discarded in landfills or the natural
environment assuming consistent use patterns and current global waste
management trends.47 One widely-cited study finds that the amount of
plastic waste entering marine ecosystems could grow by an order of
magnitude between 2010 and 2025 based on current trends in waste
management.48 Another study finds that a business-as-usual (BAU)
approach to waste management could result in 90 million tons of plastic
waste entering the world’s freshwater and marine ecosystems annually by

41
Id. Plastic packaging accounted for 42% of global primary production of nonfiber plastics in
2015. Id. The sector with the next largest use—building and construction—accounted for “19% of all
nonfiber plastics.” Id.
42
Id. at tbl.S5 (summarizing the total primary waste generation in 2015, with packaging accounting
for 141 million metric tons out of a total of 302 million metric tons).
43
# BREAKFREEFROMPLASTIC, BRANDED VOLUME III: DEMANDING CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR PLASTIC POLLUTION 48 (2020).
44
ELLEN MACARTHUR FOUND., UPSTREAM INNOVATION: A GUIDE TO PACKAGING SOLUTIONS 6–
7 (2020).
45
See generally KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 3279 (summarizing domestic and international
policies to reduce plastics pollution). Duke University’s Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy
Solutions maintains a database of over 500 laws and regulations to track developments in plastics
pollution policies. Plastics Policy Inventory, NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENV’T POL’Y SOLS. (R. Karasik, J.
Virdin, A. Pickle & J. Wilson eds., 2021), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/plastics-policy-inventory.
46
Xanthos & Walker, supra note 7, at 19–21, 2021 tbl.1.
47
Geyer, Jambeck & Lavender Law, supra note 2, at 3.
48
Jambeck et al., supra note 24, at 768.
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49

2030. In this model, even under an “ambitious” scenario where all current
plastic pollution reduction commitments are implemented, the amount of
plastic waste entering the world’s aquatic ecosystems is predicted to remain
at or exceed 2016 levels in 2030.50 Another global model suggests that the
BAU scenario could result in a total volume of plastic pollution (aquatic and
terrestrial) on the order of 81 million tons annually by 2040.51 This model
projects that implementing all feasible interventions in a scenario of
“systemic change” would only reduce the total volume of plastic pollution
by 40% in 2040, compared to 2016 rates.52
The plastic pollution problem is global in scale, but heterogenous
consumption and waste disposal patterns have resulted in very different
national contributions to the problem. Countries in Asia accounted for just
over half of global plastic production in 2018 (with China as the world’s
leading producer at 30%),53 and 20 countries were estimated to contribute 83%
to the total volume of plastic waste entering the ocean in 2010 (and China,
Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam and Sri Lanka accounted for over half of
these estimates).54 Similarly, an estimated 86% of the plastic pollution
reaching the ocean via rivers occurred on the continent of Asia,55 which has
been characterized as the epicenter of the global problem.56 However, recent
estimates suggest that the United States was the world’s largest national
producer of plastic waste in 2016 (42 million tons), and the world’s largest
contributor to plastic pollution when exported waste is included.57
There is no single solution to the global plastic pollution problem.
Systemic change is needed across all stages of plastic product life cycles and
at multiple levels from local to global.58 For example, waste management is
fundamental to solving the problem,59 though it occurs at local levels with
very different capacities around the world, often correlated to national
income.60 However, the global effort to reduce plastic pollution cannot rely
on waste management capacity alone but will require “a fundamental
49

Borrelle et al., supra note 34, at 2.
Id.
51
Lau et al., supra note 4, at 2–3.
52
Id. at 2, 4.
53
PLASTICSEUROPE, PLASTICS–THE FACTS 2019: AN ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN PLASTICS
PRODUCTION, DEMAND AND WASTE DATA 15 (2019), https://plasticseurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2
021/10/2019-Plastics-the-facts.pdf.
54
Jambeck et al., supra note 24, at 769 tbl.1, 770.
55
Lebreton et al., supra note 35, at 3.
56
Beatriz Garcia, Mandy Meng Fang & Jolene Lin, Marine Plastic Pollution in Asia: All Hands on
Deck!, 3 CHINESE J. ENV’T L. 11, 1112 (2019).
57
Kara Lavender Law et al., The United States’ Contribution of Plastic Waste to Land and Ocean,
6 SCI. ADVANCES, Oct. 30, 2020, at 1, 1, https://www.science.org/doi/pdf/10.1126/sciadv.abd0288.
58
Lau et al., supra note 4, at 1, 6.
59
Jambeck et al., supra note 24, at 768, 770.
60
SILPA KAZA ET AL., WHAT A WASTE 2.0: A GLOBAL SNAPSHOT OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
TO 2050 1–2 (2018).
50
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transformation of the plastic economy” based on circular economy
principles where end-of-life plastic products are valued and reused, unless
growth in production and use is halted.61
While the transformations and systemic change required to have a global
impact on the plastic pollution problem require differentiated responses at
multiple levels around the world, in aggregate the scale of the problem has
led to calls for global collective action.62 Designing and implementing these
policies requires recognizing that plastics pollution is simultaneously an
economic, technical, and behavioral challenge.
Plastics are often less costly than other options and virgin plastics are
less expensive to produce than recycled plastics.63 Some companies are
committing to utilize recycled plastics despite their higher costs.64 While
consumer demand and activist pressure has influenced decision-making at
some companies, in general, plastics manufacturers and consumers
externalize the environmental impacts of plastics.65 This can reduce
incentives for innovation to improve recycling and develop alternatives with
lower environmental impacts.
Economics is not the only explanation for the dramatic increase in
plastics production or the challenges with managing the waste. There are
multiple types of plastic, each with different characteristics, uses, and
environmental impacts.66 Some categories are recyclable, many are not.
61

Borrelle et al., supra note 34, at 3.
Marcus Haward, Plastic Pollution of the World’s Seas and Oceans as a Contemporary Challenge
in Ocean Governance, 9 NATURE COMMC’NS, Feb. 14, 2018, at 1, 2, https://www.nature.com/articles/s
41467-018-03104-3.pdf.
63
Jillian Ambrose, War on Plastic Waste Faces Setback as Cost of Recycled Material Soars,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/13/war-on-plasticwaste-faces-setback-as-cost-of-recycled-material-soars (describing how the cost of plastic recycling
impacts European pollution abatement policies); Eric Onstad, Plastic Bottles vs. Aluminum Cans: Who’ll
Win the Global Water Fight?, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-environment-plasticaluminium-insight-idUSKBN1WW0J5 (Oct. 17, 2019, 2:05 AM) (“Simple economics is a major factor;
aluminum is more expensive than plastic—the raw material cost for a can is about 25–30% higher than
a PET bottle of a similar volume . . . .”).
64
For example, Coca-Cola, a company that has faced high-profile critiques of its contribution to
plastics pollution, has set a goal of producing zero plastics waste by 2030, and it recently announced
plans to test a new paper bottle technology. Coca-Cola Company Trials First Paper Bottle, BBC (Feb.
12, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-56023723. Though not a binding commitment, it is an
example of a company responding to consumer pressure.
65
For example, the 2020 annual audit of #breakfreefromplastic earned international headlines when
it identified the top ten global brands responsible for plastics pollution. Rachel Koning Beals, Coca-Cola,
PepsiCo and Nestlé Top ’10 Worst Plastic Polluters’ of 2020, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 8, 2020, 5:17 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/coca-cola-pepsico-and-nestle-top-10-worst-plastic-polluters-of2020-11607465840. See also Blasiak et al., Corporations and Plastic Pollution: Trends in Reporting, 3
SUSTAINABLE FUTURES, Oct. 21, 2021, at 1, 3, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sftr.2021.100061 (finding that
“consumer pressure may already be driving attention to plastics issues” among consumer goods and
technology companies).
66
The seven categories of plastics include PET, PP, high-density polyethylene (HDPE), polyvinyl
chloride (PVC or “vinyl”), low-density polyethylene (LDPE), polystyrene (PS or Styrofoam), and other
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Conventional plastics are not biodegradable or compostable. Plastics break
down into smaller parts, but the remaining microplastics can remain in the
environment for centuries.67 Some types of plastics, such as plastic films or
plastic bags, can interfere with the ability to recycle other forms of plastics
if they are combined.68 Alternatives, such as compostable or biodegradable
plastic offer environmental benefits but require proper management.69
Compostable plastics, for example, are only compostable at industrial
facilities and are not recyclable with conventional plastics.70
The flexibility, durability, and disposability of resins make them
superior technical options for some uses. This is particularly apparent with
the increase in plastic waste during the COVID-19 pandemic, when plastics
allowed cheap and quick production of protective equipment, medical
supplies, and single-use serving implements that have been critical for
protecting public health.71 Reducing plastics waste requires new alternatives
that provide the same benefits.
There is also a critical behavioral aspect to limiting plastics pollution,
particularly with plastic packaging and single-use plastics. In many
circumstances, plastics are convenient and cheap. As companies
increasingly rely on plastic packaging, consumers may have limited options
to choose alternatives. Consumers may not have a choice between a product
with virgin plastic packaging or a similar product with other packaging.
Instead, the only choice may be purchasing the product with plastic
packaging or avoiding that type of product altogether.
Effective recycling is an important part of the solution, but this requires
enhanced education regarding which plastics are accepted. Consumer
plastics. Tod Hardin, Plastic: It’s Not All the Same, PLASTIC O CEANS (Feb. 23, 2021),
https://plasticoceans.org/7-types-of-plastic/.
67
Stephan Kubowicz & Andy M. Booth, Biodegradability of Plastics: Challenges and
Misconceptions, 51 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 12058, 12058 (2017) (“The fragmentation of the material into
increasingly smaller pieces is an unavoidable stage of the degradation process. Ultimately, plastic
materials degrade to micron-sized particles (microplastics), which are persistent in the environment and
present a potential source of harm for organisms.”).
68
Plastic Bag/Film Recycling During the Pandemic, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY (May
1, 2020), https://www.pca.state.mn.us/featured/plastic-bagfilm-recycling-during-pandemic.
69
Thomas Neitzert, Why Compostable Plastics May Be No Better for the Environment,
CONVERSATION (Aug. 2, 2018, 3:53 AM), https://theconversation.com/why-compostable-plastics-maybe-no-better-for-the-environment-100016.
70
Frequently Asked Questions About Plastic Recycling and Composting, U.S. ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY: TRASH-FREE WATERS, https://www.epa.gov/trash-free-waters/frequently-asked-questions-ab
out-plastic-recycling-and-composting (July 30, 2020).
71
Michelle Nowlin et al., Policy in the Pandemic: Are Governments Pushing the Pause Button on
Responses to Plastic Pollution?, NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENV’T POL’Y SOLS. (July 27, 2020),
https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/articles/policy-pandemic-are-governments-pushing-pause-button-resp
onses-plastic-pollution; Rob Picheta, Coronavirus Is Causing a Flurry of Plastic Waste. Campaigners
Fear It May Be Permanent, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/04/world/coronavirus-plastic-wastepollution-intl/index.html (May 4, 2020, 6:17 AM).
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demand can expand markets for recycled plastic products if the consumers
are able to evaluate claims about pre- and post-consumer content, but cost
and convenience may still eclipse interest in recycled content. Other
behavioral changes, such as purchasing products with less plastic packaging
or reducing consumption of single-use plastics, can also increase market
demand for alternatives to plastics. This depends on availability of
alternatives to send the market signal.
II.THE STATE OF PLASTICS POLLUTION POLICY
Governments around the world have responded to plastic pollution at
multiple levels: from international efforts, such as resolutions at the United
Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA), to national and subnational
efforts, such as plastic product bans, taxes, or fees.72 The number of global,
regional, national, and subnational policies targeting plastics pollution has
increased significantly over the last decade.73 While more comprehensive
policies are emerging, the majority to date have been focused on a discrete
location or a particular type of single-use plastics, such as plastic bags.74
This Part summarizes policies in place at the international, national, and
subnational levels. The policy instruments fall into three categories.
Regulatory instruments include requirements to capture post-consumer
waste, stewardship practices, limits or bans for specific types of plastics, and
prohibitions on pollution.75 Economic instruments include subsidies,
72
Carlini & Kleine, supra note 7, at 23442. A growing number of global and regional reviews
have been conducted to attempt to study these policy responses. See, e.g., C. Andrea Clayton et al., Policy
Responses to Reduce Single-Use Plastic Marine Pollution in the Caribbean, 162 MARINE POLLUTION
BULL., Nov. 16, 2020, at 1, 1, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2020.111833 (reviewing policies to
limit plastic pollution in Caribbean countries); Issahaku Adam et al., Policies to Reduce Single-Use
Plastic Marine Pollution in West Africa, 116 MARINE POL’Y, Mar. 19, 2020, at 1, 1,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103928 (reviewing West Africa’s approach to single-use plastic
reduction); Riley E.J. Schnurr et al., Reducing Marine Pollution from Single-Use Plastics (SUPs): A
Review, 137 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 157, 157 (2018) (identifying “new multi-jurisdictional
legislative interventions to reduce [single-use plastics] since 2017”); U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, LEGAL
LIMITS ON SINGLE-USE PLASTICS AND MICROPLASTICS: A GLOBAL REVIEW OF NATIONAL LAWS AND
REGULATIONS 3–4 (2018) [hereinafter UNEP SINGLE-USE PLASTICS REPORT] (categorizing plastics
pollution policy instruments and identifying the number of countries that have adopted a respective
instrument); Xanthos & Walker, supra note 7, at 17 (reviewing “international market-based strategies
and policies to reduce plastic bags and microbeads”); Jennifer Clapp & Linda Swanston, Doing Away
with Plastic Shopping Bags: International Patterns of Norm Emergence and Policy Implementation, 18
ENV’T POL. 315, 315 (2009) (examining international adoption of anti-plastic bag policies).
73
Plastics Policy Inventory, supra note 45. The Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy
Solutions plastics pollution tracker excludes generally applicable policies that can have a significant
effect on plastics pollution but are not explicitly designed to address plastics (e.g., general solid waste
management policies). Id.
74
UNEP SINGLE-USE PLASTICS REPORT, supra note 72, at 3–4.
75
KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 27–28. There are wide disparities in the use of these
instruments. The Karasik et al. study found that national governments were more “likely to use a
regulatory instrument to ban plastic bags in some form . . . [than] they were to use an economic instrument
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payments for returning plastic waste, tax breaks, and taxes or fees on certain
products (e.g., plastic bags) or post-consumer plastic waste.76 Information
instruments include record-keeping, data reporting, education, and labels or
placards.77 This Part concludes with a discussion of the impact of climate
policy on plastics pollution.
A. International Policies
Prior to 2000, international policies applicable to plastic pollution were
largely binding multilateral environmental agreements that only addressed
maritime sources.78 Since 2000, twenty-eight international policies have
addressed the plastic pollution problem at the global level, typically through
non-binding agreements focused on land-based sources79 of macroplastic
pollution.80 International efforts started to focus on different types of
pollutants in more specific terms following the 2011 Honolulu Strategy,81 a
non-binding agreement that aims to reduce the “amount and impact of
land-based sources of marine debris[;] . . . [the] amount and impact of
sea-based sources of marine debris[;] . . . [and the] amount and impact of
accumulated marine debris on shorelines,” coastal habitats, and waters.82
The instruments used in these policies typically include support for
“research and monitoring, and calls for states to develop national action
plans”—essentially plans or recommendations to develop more specific
national-level instruments in the future.83 While helping to elevate the
problem of plastic pollution on the international policy agenda, as well as
developing guidance and commitments for planning national policies, few
binding commitments have been made or specific targets set.84
As a result, experts and scholars have identified the lack of a
globally-agreed, “binding, specific and measurable” target to reduce plastic
such as a tax or a levy . . . .” Id. at 69. Furthermore, “[w]hile bans were used more frequently to address
plastic bag pollution in the inventory, lower income states were more likely to use bans than higher
income states, where economic instruments were more likely to be deployed.” Id.
76
Id. at 27–28.
77
Id. at 28.
78
Id. at 7.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 8.
81
Id. at 34–35, 105.
82
U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME & NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE HONOLULU
STRATEGY: A GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT OF MARINE DEBRIS ES-2
tbl.ES-1 (2011), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/10670/Honolulu%20strategy.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; U.N. Env’t Assembly of the U.N. Env’t Programme, Combating Marine
Plastic Litter and Microplastics: An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Relevant International, Regional
and Subregional Governance Strategies and Approaches, U.N. Doc. UNEP/EA.3/INF/5, at 43–44 (2018)
[hereinafter UNEP Marine Plastic Litter Assessment]. Earlier international efforts focused more on
generic problem definitions applying to all plastic pollutants. KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 34.
83
KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 97.
84
Id. at 43.
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pollution as a key gap in international policy responses to date. In the
absence of a global treaty on plastic pollution, the UNEA has convened
states to develop resolutions for collective action. This process has created
a framework for collecting information on existing activities and actions by
governments, regional and global instruments, international organizations,
the private sector, NGOs and other relevant contributors to the problem.87
Additionally, states have sought to address plastic pollution through the
Basel Convention to ensure environmentally sound disposal of hazardous
and other wastes.88 For example, in 2019, the Conference of the Parties
(CoP) agreed on stricter controls of transboundary movement of plastic
waste and encouraged governments to set time-bound targets to ensure that
plastic packaging is designed to be reusable and recyclable and the recycled
content in plastic products is increased, among other measures.89
At the regional level, the majority of policies have been introduced over
the last decade, consisting largely of non-binding action plans facilitated by
the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) in the context of
Regional Seas Programs and European Union policies that were often
binding but depended upon national legislation (e.g., directives to member
states focused on reducing consumption of lightweight plastic carrier bags,
or recycling mandates).90 These policies have often taken a more holistic and
comprehensive approach to addressing plastic pollution, focused on leakage
across all stages of the life cycle of plastic products, coupled with
forward-looking policy actions such as extended producer responsibility
requirements, information instruments, or model national legislation.91 For
example, the EU’s 2019 policy moved beyond recycling targets to focus on
reducing consumption, requiring member states to adopt a mix of
instruments that in aggregate were estimated to cover 86% of the single-use
plastics found in the states’ beach counts, such as bans where plastic
85

Id.
See, e.g., Carlini & Kleine, supra note 7, at 239 (noting that gaps include “the lack of a global
institution whose mandate focuses on the coordination of existing efforts, and the management of the
marine plastic litter and microplastics across its life cycle . . . . a lack of globally binding standards to
mitigate plastic pollution,” and an insufficient recognition of “the potential risks to human health . . .
[and] the widespread disregard for due diligence and the polluter pays principle by the relevant industry
sectors”) (footnotes omitted); UNEP Marine Plastic Litter Assessment, supra note 82, at 11–12
(identifying “major gaps and challenges in the international, regional and sub-regional frameworks”);
Joanna Zofia Vince & Britta Denise Hardesty, Plastic Pollution Challenges in Marine and Coastal
Environments: From Local to Global Governance, 25 RESTORATION ECOLOGY 123, 124 (2017) (“There
is a large gap in international hard law specifically addressing land-based plastic marine pollution.”).
87
U.N. Env’t Assembly Res. 4/6, U.N. Doc. UNEP/EA.4/Res.6, at 1–3 (Mar. 15, 2019).
88
Karen Raubenheimer & Alistair McIlgorm, Can the Basel and Stockholm Conventions Provide
a Global Framework to Reduce the Impact of Marine Plastic Litter?, 96 MARINE POL’Y 285, 286–89
(2018).
89
KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 42.
90
Id. at 44.
91
Id. at 47.
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alternatives were available, coupled with information instruments to help
change behavior.92 However, with the exception of the EU policies, the
majority of regional policies, while frequently comprehensive in scope, have
rarely been binding.
B. National and Subnational Policies
Plastic pollution has frequently been addressed by governments at the
sub-national level, particularly in municipalities, often to ban specific items
such as plastic carrier bags. In the United States, for example, cities and
states have led a regulatory push to ban or tax plastic carrier bags and other
pollutants, notably in California.93 Acting as a laboratory for local plastics
regulation in the United States,94 municipalities throughout the state
introduced regulations to combat plastic pollution throughout the last
decade, notably including a state-wide ban on the use of plastic carrier bags
in 2014.95 By 2016, 242 local governments had introduced policies aiming
to reduce pollution from plastic carrier bags.96
Multiple studies have suggested that national policies to address plastic
pollution have increased significantly in the last decade, as the issue has
risen on the policy agenda.97 These policies are typically more narrowly
focused on specific forms of single-use plastics.98 In particular, the growth
in national policies over the last decade was driven by legislation introduced
solely to address pollution from plastic carrier bags, though examples of
more comprehensive “all of the above” approaches to macroplastics

92
Directive 2019/904, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the
Reduction of the Impact of Certain Plastic Products on the Environment, 2019 O.J. (L155/1) 7.
93
Travis P. Wagner, Reducing Single-Use Plastic Shopping Bags in the USA, 70 WASTE MGMT. 3,
7 (2017); Jennie R. Romer & Leslie Mintz Tamminen, Plastic Bag Reduction Ordinances: New York
City’s Proposed Charge on All Carryout Bags as a Model for U.S. Cities, 27 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 237, 241,
244, 247 (2014); Jessica R. Coulter, A Sea of Change to Change the Sea: Stopping the Spread of the
Pacific Garbage Patch with Small-Scale Environmental Legislation, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959,
1983, 1992 (2010); Rebecca Fromer, Comment, Concessions of a Shopaholic: An Analysis of the
Movement to Minimize Single-Use Shopping Bags from the Waste Stream and a Proposal for State
Implementation in Louisiana, 23 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 493, 50203, 508 (2010); Jennie Reilly Romer,
Comment, The Evolution of San Francisco’s Plastic-Bag Ban, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENV’T L.J. 439, 465
(2007); Clapp & Swanston, supra note 72, at 327.
94
Rebecca L. Taylor & Sofia B. Villas-Boas, Bans vs. Fees: Disposable Carryout Bag Policies and
Bag Usage, 38 APPLIED ECON. PERSPS. & POL’Y 351, 355–56 (2016).
95
S. 270, 20132014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
96
Rebecca L.C. Taylor, Bag Leakage: The Effect of Disposable Carryout Bag Regulations on
Unregulated Bags, 93 J. ENV’T ECON. & MGMT. 254, 255 (2019).
97
Schnurr et al., supra note 72, at 158–60, 15960 tbl.1, 160 fig.1; UNEP SINGLE-USE PLASTICS
REPORT, supra note 72, at 10–11; KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 57, 58 fig.14.
98
Schnurr et al., supra note 72, at 158–63, 15960 tbl.1, 161 tbl.2, 16465 tbl.3.
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emerged in recent years. By the first half of 2019, national governments
had regulated various forms of plastic carrier bags in at least forty-three
countries, most commonly through a ban, and to a lesser extent by tax or
levy (but often not paired with information instruments).100 Countries in
Africa have been global leaders in national-level efforts to reduce pollution
from plastic carrier bags, particularly through regulatory bans.101 More
broadly, lower- and lower-middle income countries have been more willing
to adopt national policies to control plastics pollution.102
A regulatory ban is by far the most common instrument implemented at
the national level to combat plastics pollution, much more so than economic
incentives such as taxes or fees.103 At least twenty-five countries have
banned some form of plastic packaging or other single-use plastic product,
beyond plastic carrier bags.104 Notably, seven of the top twenty producers of
mismanaged coastal waste do not have a national policy aiming to address
plastic pollution (Philippines, Thailand, Egypt, Algeria, Brazil, Myanmar,
and North Korea), and another four only have a policy targeted to plastic
carrier bags, based on analysis to date (Nigeria, Bangladesh, South Africa,
and Morocco).105
National governments have introduced relatively few policies to address
microplastic pollution. Of the few national microplastics policies that are in
place, all but one was introduced within the last five years.106 Similarly, only
in 2014 did international policies at the global level start to focus on
microplastics as part of the plastic pollution problem, with more specificity
in UNEA’s 2016 resolution (2/11).107 These policies have typically focused
on plastic microbeads in personal care products, leading some researchers to
suggest that regulatory bans could feasibly eliminate these microbeads
before 2030.108 Given that the majority of policies introduced by
governments to address plastic pollution occurred within the last decade,
relatively few observations of their effects on the problem have been
published, and these have almost solely focused on laws or regulations for

99
KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 67 (citing examples of recent comprehensive responses to
land-based sources of plastic pollution, including by Denmark and India in 2016 and by Panama,
Rwanda, and Tanzania in 2019).
100
Id. at 8–9.
101
Adam et al., supra note 72, at 1.
102
Clapp & Swanston, supra note 72, at 319–20.
103
KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 8–9.
104
Id. at 10.
105
Id. at 62.
106
Id. at 71.
107
Id. at 34, 40–41.
108
Peter Dauvergne, Why Is the Global Governance of Plastic Failing the Oceans?, 51 GLOB.
ENV’T CHANGE 22, 25–26 (2018).
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plastic bags (largely in Europe and North America). These studies have
noted significant effects on reduction in plastic bag consumption, together
with unintended consequences in some cases such as increased demand for
paper or other non-reusable bags, related to a number of factors including:
the amount of the tax or fee set for economic instruments, the availability of
inexpensive, reusable alternatives, public awareness and acceptance of the
policy, and levels of enforcement of compliance,110 among others. Beyond
studies of policy instruments to address pollution from plastic bags,
economic instruments encouraging recycling of plastic beverage containers
(“cash deposit schemes”) have also been assessed in some cases in Europe
and North America.111 These studies have found strong evidence that such
economic instruments reduce pollution from plastic beverage containers,
due to increased rates of recycling incentivized by the deposits required.112
In summary, while governments’ attention to the problem of plastic
pollution has grown over the last decade, with more new policies introduced
at every level, these have largely been either relatively comprehensive but
non-binding at the international level, or more specific and targeted to
individual plastic types at the national or sub-national level, most frequently
plastic bags. As a result, the current policy landscape is a patchwork, only
partially covering many plastic production supply chains.113 At the same
time, though relatively little analysis of effectiveness is yet available beyond
some regulation of plastic bags and to a lesser extent plastic beverage
containers, governments have clearly preferred regulatory bans to economic
instruments among the policy patchwork, and the latter have largely been
fees assessed to consumers acting as “nudges,” rather than taxes aiming to
internalize the social cost of the pollution.114

109
See KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 30108 app. XI (listing publications examining plastics
pollution policies).
110
Patricia K. Mogomotsi, Goemeone E. J. Mogomotsi & Nametso D. Phonchi, Plastic Bag Usage
in a Taxed Environment: Investigation on the Deterrent Nature of Plastic Levy in Maun, Botswana, 37
WASTE MGMT. & RSCH. 20, 21, 24 (2019); Johane Dikgang, Anthony Leiman & Martine Visser, Analysis
of the Plastic-Bag Levy in South Africa, 66 RES. CONSERVATION & RECYCLING 59, 6061 (2012); Taylor
& Villas-Boas, supra note 94, at 352, 372; Lea Marie Heidbreder et al., Tackling the Plastic Problem: A
Review on Perceptions, Behaviors, and Interventions, 668 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 1077, 107986 (2019);
Graça Martinho, Natacha Balaia & Ana Pires, The Portuguese Plastic Carrier Bag Tax: The Effects on
Consumers’ Behavior, 61 WASTE MGMT. 3, 34 (2017); U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, SINGLE-USE
PLASTICS: A ROADMAP FOR SUSTAINABILITY viix (2d ed. 2018) [hereinafter SINGLE-USE PLASTICS
SUSTAINABILITY REPORT].
111
SINGLE-USE PLASTICS SUSTAINABILITY REPORT, supra note 110, at 11.
112
Qamar Schuyler et al., Economic Incentives Reduce Plastic Inputs to the Ocean, 96 MARINE
POL’Y 250, 25052, 254 (2018).
113
WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE, ELLEN MACARTHUR FOUND. & BOS. CONSULTING GRP.,
THE BUSINESS CASE FOR A UN TREATY ON PLASTIC POLLUTION 23 (2020).
114
KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 82.
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C. The Plastic Pollution-Climate Policy Nexus
In addition to policies aimed directly at reducing plastics pollution, there
are also two important connections between climate change policies and
plastics. Like many industrial sectors, each step of the plastics
manufacturing process produces GHG emissions and other harmful
pollutants, from producing and transporting raw materials, manufacturing
plastics, and transporting the products to their respective markets.115 Unlike
many other sectors, however, plastics manufacturing also depends upon
petroleum or natural gas as a feedstock.116
Plastics, along with fertilizers and other products that depend upon
petrochemical feedstocks, account for approximately 12% of global oil
demand, thus amplifying the sector’s GHG emissions impact.117 The
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) projects that the
petrochemical sector will be “the largest single contributor to incremental
oil demand” through 2045.118 According to a 2016 report by the Ellen
MacArthur Foundation, plastic production could quadruple by 2050,
accounting for “20% of total oil consumption and 15% of the global annual
carbon budget by 2050.”119
Policies aimed at reducing GHG emissions necessarily impact fossil fuel
consumption, at least in the absence of cost-effective, technologically
feasible carbon capture technologies. Plastics manufacturing is not an
exception. Nonetheless, a carbon price would have less of an impact on
plastics manufacturing than on other sectors of the economy where the
climate change impact is due to direct emissions from a smokestack or
tailpipe rather than the emissions embedded in a feedstock. The cost of
refining petroleum would increase, but not necessarily enough to impact the
competitiveness of alternatives to virgin plastics.
115
See, e.g., Jiajia Zheng & Sangwon Suh, Strategies to Reduce the Global Carbon Footprint of
Plastics, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 374, 374 (2019) (projecting that “GHG emissions from plastics
would reach 15% of the global carbon budget by 2050” if current production trends continue); LISA
ANNE HAMILTON ET AL., PLASTIC & CLIMATE: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF A PLASTIC PLANET 80 (Amanda
Kistler & Carroll Muffett eds., 2019) (projecting that the lifecycle emissions from plastics could reach
1.34 gigatons per year by 2030).
116
Plastics manufacturing depends upon either petroleum or natural gas products. HAMILTON ET
AL., supra note 115, at 21.
117
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, THE FUTURE OF PETROCHEMICALS: TOWARDS MORE SUSTAINABLE
PLASTICS AND FERTILISERS 78 (2018).
118
ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, 2020 WORLD OIL OUTLOOK 2045 114
(2020). The OPEC projections show oil demand by the petrochemical sector increasing by 3.7 million
barrels of oil per day. Id. at 91 (“The petrochemicals sector (+3.7 mb/d), followed by aviation (+2.8
mb/d) and road transportation (+2.6 mb/d), will be the primary drivers of oil demand between 2019 and
2045.”). Similarly, the 2019 BP Energy Outlook found that “the noncombusted use of fuels within
industry—particularly as a feedstock in petrochemicals—is the fastest growing source of incremental
[energy] demand.” BP, BP ENERGY OUTLOOK 29 (2019 ed., 2019).
119
WORLD ECON. F., ELLEN MACARTHUR FOUND. & MCKINSEY & CO., THE NEW PLASTICS
ECONOMY: RETHINKING THE FUTURE OF PLASTICS 17, 24 (2016).
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Carbon markets, such as the European Emissions Trading Scheme or the
California Cap-and-Trade Program, focus on smokestack emissions.120
There are several reasons why policymakers make this choice, primary
among them are administrative efficiency and monitoring.121 There is a
discrete number of facilities emitting more than 25,000 tons of CO2e per
year and it is relatively straightforward to measure emissions from these
facilities.122 Carbon markets typically do not focus on emissions that may
occur upstream from those facilities.123 Instead, these policies rely on the
increase in production costs to reduce demand for products with higher
associated emissions.124 This means that the petroleum refining stage would
be subject to the emissions cap rather than the extraction, distribution, or
end-use stages.
Nonetheless, a carbon price may impact the economics of plastics
production, particularly if the price gap narrows between virgin plastics and
recycled plastics or alternative products. In turn, the expanded market for
recycled plastics or packaging alternatives could reduce demand for virgin
plastic as carbon price increase. Carbon market revenue can also support
technology innovation, such as California’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Fund that deploys auction proceeds from the state’s Cap-and-Trade Program
to “increase[] in-state diversion of municipal solid waste from disposal
through waste reduction, diversion, and reuse.”125
Perhaps counterintuitively, a price on GHG emissions could also have
the opposite effect by incentivizing investment in virgin plastics if demand
for petroleum as a transportation fuel is projected to decline in the coming
decades due to electrification and efficiency improvements.126 Petroleum
companies lose market share in a carbon constrained future when consumers
shift to lower emitting vehicles or electric vehicles. Climate policies may
similarly reduce demand for natural gas. The emphasis on plastics may
increase if petroleum and natural gas companies look for new revenue
120
Alice Kaswan, Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? State Controls Within a Federal Greenhouse
Gas Cap-and-Trade Program, 28 VA. ENV’T L.J. 343, 358 (2010).
121
Id. at 351.
122
Key Facts and Figures, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY: GREENHOUSE GAS REPORTING PROGRAM
(GHGRP), https://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/key-facts-and-figures (Nov. 9, 2020).
123
Eliot Metzger, Bottom Line on Cap-and-Trade, WORLD RES. INST., June 2008, at 1, 1,
https://www.wri.org/research/bottom-line-cap-and-trade.
124
Id.
125
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Grant and Loan Programs, CALRECYCLE, https://www.calrecycle.
ca.gov/Climate/GrantsLoans/ (May 28, 2021). These grants “are targeted to build or expand organics
infrastructure, such as composting and anaerobic digestion, or rescuing food to feed hungry people, as
well as new or expanded infrastructure for manufacturing products with recycled content fiber, plastic,
or glass.” Id.
126
Amy Harder, Oil Companies Double Down on Plastics as Public Outcry Grows, AXIOS (June
17, 2019), https://www.axios.com/oil-companies-double-down-on-plastics-as-public-outcry-grows1dcb68ce-5559-47e3-8745-a192a0a106e7.html.
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streams to replace demand from the transportation and electricity sectors.127
There is some evidence that this is already underway.128
III. TOWARD A BROADER MARKET-BASED APPROACH TO
PLASTICS POLLUTION
Each of the existing approaches to plastics pollution have limitations.
The current scope of local plastics bans may help limit local pollution but
will not likely affect global plastics production or incentivize innovation,
given their inconsistent application to markets through a patchwork of
national and municipal laws and regulations around the world.129 Similarly,
current pricing instruments function as policy nudges that seek to influence
consumer choices.130 Nudges can address some of the behavioral aspects of
the pollution problem, but these limited pricing policies cannot address the
exponential growth of plastics production.131 Depending on the policy
design, climate policy alone may reduce plastics production, or may create
incentives for increased investment in plastics production to counter reduced
demand for transportation fuels. Broader responses are therefore necessary
to halt the trajectory of plastics growth through development of alternative
products and improved waste management.
There is increasing interest in pollution pricing and pollution caps to
address plastics to help states meet any binding targets to reduce plastic
pollution, particularly to target single-use plastics or non-recycled
plastics.132 For example, the European Council approved a tax on
non-recycled plastic packaging as part of the July 2020 Covid recovery plan
and the EU agreed on a tax for plastic packaging waste for member states to
introduce.133 Broader use of market-based policies can address many of the
127
See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi, Michael Corkery & Carlos Mureithi, Big Oil Is in Trouble. Its Plan:
Flood Africa with Plastic., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/30/climate/
oil-kenya-africa-plastics-trade.html (reporting on efforts to increase plastics production in Africa and
overturn anti-plastics policies).
128
See, e.g., id. (reporting on efforts to reverse Kenya’s limits on domestic plastics and imported
waste).
129
KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 82.
130
Id.
131
Id. A tax on plastic bags, for example, can encourage shoppers to bring their own bags or place
more products in a bag.
132
See, e.g., Taxes on Single-Use Plastics, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/stories/ocean/taxes-onsingle-use-plastics-186a058b (last visited Sep. 22, 2021) (“Taxes on plastic material, certain types of
plastics polymer or certain uses of plastics (e.g.[,] single-use packaging) can help reduce unsustainable
consumption of plastic materials.”); Chantal Carriere & Rachael Beavers Horne, The Case for a
Legislated Market in Minimum Recycled Content for Plastics, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10042, 10050 (2020)
(proposing a market-based approach for mandating minimum recycled content for single-use plastic
packaging).
133
General Secretariat of the Council Conclusions, Special Meeting of the European Council (17,
18, 19, 20 and 21 July 2020), Brussels European Council, ¶¶ A29, 146 (July 21, 2020),
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/45109/210720-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf.
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economic, technical, and behavioral challenges identified in Part I of this
Article, depending upon the context.
A century ago, Arthur Pigou recognized that pollution and other
negative externalities occur when those who produce the pollution avoid
paying for the societal harm they cause.134 Imposing a fee can change the
economic calculation. Higher polluting options that were economic in the
absence of an emissions price may become less competitive if the production
process incorporates the cost that pollution imposes on society.135 Firms
facing a price on pollution can choose to either pay the price or reduce or
eliminate the targeted pollution.136 The flexibility allowed by market-based
approaches can reduce compliance costs and, if the price or pollution cap is
set at an appropriate level, overall pollution will decrease.137
A pollution tax or auctioned allowances can generate revenue that can
fund waste management programs or technology research and
development.138 In addition, the price itself may induce investment in new
waste management and recycling options, or development of new products
with less environmental harm.139 Higher prices for plastic products or
expanded use of fees or taxes for consumer goods with non-recycled plastic
packaging can change behavioral incentives, and increased availability of
consumer options can facilitate different choices.140
Plastics pollution shares important characteristics with climate change,
and these similarities allow climate policy to inform design of market-based
plastics pollution policies.141 As a starting point, both GHGs and plastics can
be characterized as stock pollutants that cause harm due to their accumulation
in the environment, as opposed flow pollutants that may have cumulative

134

ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 27–28 (1920).
See, e.g., NATHANIEL O. KEOHANE & SHEILA M. OLMSTEAD, MARKETS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 180 (2d ed. 2016) (comparing policy instruments and finding “the incentive to adopt new
technologies with lower marginal costs is greater under an emission tax [and cap-and-trade system] than
under a performance standard”).
136
Ted Gayer, Pricing Pollution, BROOKINGS (Jan. 5, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/
pricing-pollution/.
137
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY:
RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 100 (2009) (noting that the Acid Rain Trading Program “dramatically
reduced acid rain at much lower costs than the traditional Government regulations and mandates of the
past”).
138
MARISSA SANTIKARN ET AL., THE USE OF AUCTION REVENUE FROM EMISSIONS TRADING
SYSTEMS: DELIVERING ENVIRONMENTAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL BENEFITS 6, 10, 12 ( 2019).
139
See Taxes on Single-Use Plastics, OECD, supra note 132 (“The application of taxes to single-use
plastic items can help to increase the price of such items, and therefore drive demand away from such
items and result in substitution. Well-designed taxes should lead to the use of more durable and/or more
sustainable alternatives.”).
140
See id. (summarizing the impacts of various taxes on single-use plastics around the world).
141
Economic Incentives, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY: ENV’T ECON., https://www.epa.gov/environ
mental-economics/economic-incentives (last visited Sept. 22, 2021).
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health effects but do not accumulate in the environment. GHGs accumulate
in the atmosphere and plastic pollutants accumulate in freshwater and ocean
ecosystems.143 This distinction between stock and flow pollutants can help
inform policy design by, for example, affecting the slope of the economic
benefits curve of reductions as a factor in choice of instruments.144
Technologies exist to reduce GHG emissions and alternatives exist for
many uses of plastics, but these alternatives compete with existing supply
chains that create economic and political barriers to options with less social
and environmental impacts. The alternatives to high GHG emissions or
plastics may also be more expensive, particularly if the sources of pollution
can externalize the social and environmental harms.
Similar to plastics pollution, the geography of GHG emissions varies
widely, by country and by economic sector.145 The businesses and nations
that are the largest sources of GHG emissions are not necessarily the same
areas that are experiencing the most severe near-term impacts of climate
change.146 Disparities between those contributing to the global challenge and
those that are harmed result in economic incentives at the national and firm
level to continue creating the pollution.147 A handful of countries are
responsible for the vast majority of anthropogenic GHG emissions, but
population growth and economic development in developing countries are
causing a shift in the major emitters.148
A common refrain among opponents of U.S. climate policy is that the
country could cut emissions completely, but it would not have an impact
because emissions in other parts of the world are likely to climb.149 There are
obvious responses. The United States was the largest emitter historically, and
thus is largely responsible for much of the current atmospheric

142
Diego Villarreal, Understanding GHG Emissions: Stock vs. Flows, COLUM. CLIMATE SCH.:
STATE OF THE PLANET (July 18, 2011), https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2011/07/18/understandingghg-emissions-stock-vs-flows/.
143
Penghui Li et al., Characteristics of Plastic Pollution in the Environment: A Review, 107 BULL.
ENV’T CONTAMINATION & TOXICOLOGY 577, 577–78 (2020).
144
Villarreal, supra note 142.
145
Projected Growth in CO2 Emissions Driven by Countries Outside the OECD, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (May 16, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=26252.
146
Glenn Althor, James E. M. Watson & Richard A. Fuller, Global Mismatch Between Greenhouse
Gas Emissions and the Burden of Climate Change, 6 SCI. REPS., Feb. 5, 2016, at 1, 1–3,
https://www.nature.com/articles/srep20281.pdf.
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Id.
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Economic Incentives, supra note 141.
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See, e.g., Charli Coon, Why President Bush Is Right to Abandon the Kyoto Protocol, HERITAGE
FOUND. (May 11, 2001), https://www.heritage.org/node/19307/print-display (“[A]ny agreement that
allows the developing countries to continue emitting greenhouse gases would in effect negate the efforts
of those countries that are trying to reduce them. It would drastically increase the cost of gasoline,
electricity, and fuel oil for Americans and cause significant harm to the U.S. economy.”).
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150

concentration. The United States remains the second largest global emitter,
behind China, despite the rise in emissions from developing countries.151 The
argument for U.S. inaction also rings hollow because other countries can use
the same critique to avoid action.152 A similar dynamic could impact global
efforts to reduce plastics pollution if the United States—currently the largest
producer of plastic waste—refuses to support international negotiations.153
Just as there are numerous similarities in the characteristics of the plastic
pollution and climate change problems, there are important differences that
can allow more flexibility in plastics policy. Climate change is causing
different regional climate and weather impacts, but GHG emissions are
globally mixing pollutants. Emissions from anywhere in the world have the
same impact on global atmospheric concentration, and thus heat-trapping,
no matter where emissions occur.154 Therefore, actions to reduce emissions
in some regions may not result in an overall decrease in atmospheric
concentration if emissions increase in other regions.
With plastics, the problem is primarily the product rather than the
manufacturing process. There are social and environmental impacts
throughout the plastics value chain, but the harms that distinguish plastics
from other materials is the plastic itself. With climate change, the harmful
pollutants are externalities resulting from the production of the desired
products or services. This means that it is possible to reduce the plastic
pollution by replacing the products with less harmful alternatives. The other
social and environmental problems associated with plastic production may
also arise with the alternatives, such as pollution from extraction of raw
materials, manufacturing, and transportation, and impacts of waste on
communities, but plastic pollution would decrease. Additionally, not all
plastic products contribute equally to local, national, or international plastics
pollution. Single-use food packaging, for example, is a larger contributor to
150
Chris Mooney, The U.S. Has Caused More Global Warming than Any Other Country. Here’s
How the Earth Will Get Its Revenge., WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/n
ews/energy-environment/wp/2015/01/22/the-u-s-has-contributed-more-to-global-warming-than-anyother-country-heres-how-the-earth-will-get-its-revenge/.
151
Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY: GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data (Oct. 26, 2021).
152
See, e.g., Muyu Xu & David Stanway, China Accuses U.S. of Deflecting Blame as Diplomatic
Row Shifts to Climate, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-china-politics/chi
na-accuses-u-s-of-deflecting-blame-as-diplomatic-row-shifts-to-climate-idUSKBN27D0JB (Oct. 28,
2020, 1:51 AM) (discussing Chinese criticisms of U.S. inaction on climate change).
153
See Lavender Law et al., supra note 57, at 3 (finding that the United States is responsible for the
largest amount of global plastic waste as compared to other countries responsible for producing plastic
itself).
154
See KEVIN A. BAUMERT, TIMOTHY HERZOG & JONATHAN PERSHING, NAVIGATING THE
NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 16 (2005) (discussing how
the lack of international cooperation will fail to mitigate GHG emissions). See also What Is a Carbon
Offset?, CARBON OFFSET GUIDE, http://www.offsetguide.org/understanding-carbon-offsets/what-is-acarbon-offset/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2021) (explaining the impact of GHGs mixing globally).
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the plastic waste problem than plastics used for construction. Some types of
plastics may offer benefits that outweigh the harms of pollution (e.g., medical
supplies and protective equipment compared with single-use plastic bottles).156
Additionally, while ocean plastic pollution is a global problem, plastic
pollution can have local, regional, and global impacts depending on how the
waste is managed.157 This changes the self-interest calculus and the ability
for unilateral action to result in tangible benefits. It also points to the need
for additional complementary policies to provide a comprehensive response
to the different scales of the plastics pollution challenge.
This Part begins with an overview of the key design choices that
policymakers must consider when designing a new market-based pollution
abatement program. The discussion then turns to the climate policy lessons
that can inform market-based plastics pollution policy design. Part III.B
provides a brief history of climate policy to explain how policy design
choices are reflected in major national and international climate policies.
These existing policy choices provide a foundation for the subsequent focus
on lessons for plastics policy. The Part concludes with seven specific lessons
from climate policy than can inform new market-based plastics pollution
policies, including areas where the differences between plastics pollution
and climate change may suggest a particular approach for plastics.
A. Design Choices for Market-Based Pollution Abatement Policies
A starting point for pricing plastics pollution, or any form of pollution
for that matter, is identifying the pollutants, products, processes, or attributes
that are subject to the price. The design of a market-based approach creates
incentives for certain types of behavior. What is allowed by the market rules,
and what is left out, will determine which environmental and social goals
are addressed.
155
SINGLE-USE PLASTICS SUSTAINABILITY REPORT, supra note 110, at 4 fig.1.2 (illustrating how
single-use plastics production in the packaging industry exceeds plastic production in the building and
construction industry).
156
See, e.g., Neha Parashar & Subrata Hait, Plastics in the Time of COVID-19 Pandemic: Protector
or Polluter?, 759 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T, Dec. 20, 2020, at 1, 2, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.14427
4 (“Plastics have contributed immensely to the healthcare sector and public health safety during the
pandemic. In addition to the imposition of nationwide lockdown, social distancing, restriction on traveling
and public gathering, frequent usage of hand sanitizers along with wearing of mostly plastic-based personal
protective equipment (PPEs), viz. face masks, gloves for common citizens to protective medical suits,
aprons, gowns, face shields, surgical masks, and other PPEs for frontline health workers as precautionary
measures have been adopted to avoid virus contamination to fight the spread of COVID-19.”)
157
See, e.g., Study of the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and
Constitutional Affairs on the Environmental Impacts of Plastics and Micro-Plastics Use, Waste and
Pollution: EU and National Measures, at 36 (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/STUD/2020/658279/IPOL_STU(2020)658279_EN.pdf (concluding that “[r]egional initiatives
are also insufficient to address the issue of pollution, as local or regional (eco)systems are interconnected
to wider and larger networks such as ocean currents and migratory pathways”).
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Policymakers designing a market-based approach to plastics pollution
must decide what unit to measure—e.g., volume, type of plastic,
pre-consumer or post-consumer content, recyclability, emissions associated
with production, or use of the plastic product. Similarly, policymakers face
a threshold question of how to set a pollution price or cap.
A market-based pollution abatement policy can implement the pollution
price via a pollution tax or set a quantitative limit on pollution, commonly
referred to as a “cap-and-trade” program.158 A pollution tax requires emitters
to pay the specified price for each unit of pollution released during a
compliance period. A cap-and-trade program is more complex but can create
more compliance flexibility that results in a lower cost. Policymakers may
use economic models to translate the pollution price into a quantitative limit
or set the limit without starting with cost. The policy specifies the pollution
cap for a compliance period (e.g., one year) and issues one allowance (or
tradeable credit) for each unit of pollution allowed under the cap.159 For
example, if a hypothetical cap-and-trade program caps pollution at 100 tons
of pollution emitted annually, there would be 100 allowances available each
year.160 Parties may trade the allowances and those subject to the pollution
cap must have permits for each unit of pollution (e.g., tons of carbon dioxide)
emitted during a compliance period.161 The allowance price is determined
by supply and demand of available allowances.162
The compliance flexibility of a tax or a market allows individual entities
to decide whether to reduce emissions at their facilities or pay a price for the
emissions.163 These approaches result in different types of uncertainty.164
The pollution tax creates cost certainty but may or may not achieve the

158
Policies with quantitative limits do not have to allow trading. Policies can set firm pollution
limits for each source.
159
See How Do Emissions Trading Programs Work?, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY: EMISSIONS
TRADING RES., https://www.epa.gov/emissions-trading-resources/how-do-emissions-trading-programswork (July 8, 2021) (summarizing the key elements of an emissions trading program).
160
These policies can distribute the allowances for free, sell the allowances via auction, or do a
combination of the two. See, e.g., Allowance Allocation: Overview, CAL. AIR RES. BD.,
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/cap-and-trade-program/allowance-allocation (last visited
Sept. 19, 2021) (“CARB distributes allowances to the Cap-and-Trade Program market through two
primary mechanisms: direct allocation to regulated entities and sale at auction to all market
participants.”).
161
How Do Emissions Trading Programs Work?, supra note 159.
162
Bruce R. Huber, How Did RGGI Do It? Political Economy and Emissions Auctions, 40
ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 77–78 (2013).
163
See Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Regional Energy Governance and U.S. Carbon
Emissions, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143, 163–64 (2016) (describing a hypothetical trading system).
164
See Lawrence H. Goulder & Andrew R. Schein, Carbon Taxes Versus Cap and Trade: A Critical
Review, 4 CLIMATE CHANGE ECON. 1350010-1, 1350010-13 (2013) (comparing a carbon tax, a capand-trade system, and a hybrid approach); Wiener, supra note 14, at 515–18 (describing different types
of emissions pricing policy instruments).
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desired pollution reduction. The quantitative approach creates certainty
about the amount of pollution, but relying on market dynamics to determine
the price creates uncertainty regarding the cost of allowances.166 Allowance
prices may fluctuate depending on factors such as policy stringency, policy
timeline, disruptions in supply chains, shifting projections about product
demand, or the state of the overall economy.167
Policymakers from multiple jurisdictions can work together to design a
single set of rules governing the market-based approach or, alternatively,
can design the policy to apply solely to their respective jurisdictions. Policy
linkage allows market-based approaches implemented by different
governments to collectively send a broader price signal and potentially
increase compliance flexibility. However, relying on linkage to expand
existing pollution abatement markets may require policy adjustments by the
linking jurisdictions. Depending on the degree of commitment each
jurisdiction has to its existing market design choices, the need for
adjustments may create barriers to successful linkage. For example,
differences regarding the pollution limit, the market participants, the
compliance obligations, whether a jurisdiction auctions or freely allocates
allowances, and the availability of cost containment provisions may prohibit
market interaction.
B. A Brief History of U.S. and International Carbon Pricing
Leading up to 2010, climate policy debates in the United States and
internationally focused on developing uniform, legally enforceable
requirements to reduce GHG emissions. Emissions markets were a central
feature in domestic and international policy design.168
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
launched the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), which remains the primary forum for international climate
negotiations.169 From the beginning, negotiators sought binding acceptance
of the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” creating

165

KEOHANE & OLMSTEAD, supra note 135, at 14445.
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Harrison Fell & Richard D. Morgenstern, Collaring Price Volatility in a Carbon Offset Market,
RES. (Mar. 15, 2010), https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/collaring-price-volatility-in-acarbon-offset-market/ (“Price volatility arises because in a traditional cap-and-trade program, annual
emissions levels are fixed, but other price determining factors can vary from year to year.”).
168
Emissions Trading, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyotoprotocol/mechanisms/emissions-trading (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107
[hereinafter U.N. Framework Convention]; Status of Ratification of the Convention, U.N. CLIMATE
CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-convention/status-of-ratification/status-of-ratifica
tion-of-the-convention (last visited Nov. 20, 2021).
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different obligations for developed and developing countries.
The
UNFCCC called for developed countries to adopt binding commitments to
reduce GHG emissions.171 The UNFCCC also called for developed countries
to provide financial resources to help developing countries reduce emissions
and adapt to climate change.172 The 2007 Kyoto Protocol formally adopted
the “common but differentiated responsibilities” framework, establishing
emission reduction targets for developed countries and no commitments for
developing countries.173 The Kyoto Protocol implemented climate
mitigation architecture for the initial period of 2008 through 2012, with the
U.N. serving as the central body for monitoring compliance.174
The Kyoto Protocol authorized emissions trading and created the first
compliance-based international carbon offsets markets.175 One offsets market,
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), allowed developed countries to
fund emission abatement projects in developing countries and receive credits
representing the equivalent of one metric ton of CO2 each.176 Another
program, Joint Implementation (JI), created a separate commodity—emission
reduction units (ERUs)—to facilitate cooperation on abatement projects
among developed countries.177
The Kyoto Protocol was controversial from the beginning. The U.S.
Senate passed a non-binding resolution opposing U.S. participation in the
Protocol by a vote of 95-0 against ratification, due in part to the failure to
impose emission reduction targets on all nations.178 In 2001, then-President
George W. Bush announced his opposition to the Protocol, effectively

170

U.N. Framework Convention, supra note 169, art. 4.1.
Id. art. 4.2(a).
172
Id. art. 4.3, 4.5, 4.8.
173
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 10, Dec.
10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148.
174
Id. art. 3.1.
175
Id. arts. 6, 12, 16 bis.
176
U.N. Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Modalities and Procedures for a Clean
Development Mechanism, as Defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2, at 2050 (Jan. 21, 2002).
177
Joint Implementation, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/j
oint_implementation/items/1674.php (last visited Oct. 6, 2021).
178
S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). The resolution stated:
171

The United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement
regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at
negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would . . . mandate new
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties,
unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country
Parties within the same compliance period, or . . . would result in serious harm to the
economy of the United States.
Id.
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ending any prospect of U.S. participation. Some developed countries
became parties to the agreement, but failed to meet their commitments.180
One of these countries, Canada, withdrew from the Protocol.181 The CDM
lacked sufficient oversight and verification, resulting in ineffective projects
and, in some instances, fraud.182 Recognizing these limitations, international
negotiators focused on creating a new agreement to replace the Kyoto
Protocol even as member countries to the Protocol were engaged in separate
negotiations to extend the existing framework.183
The UNFCCC negotiations originally focused on developing a uniform,
legally binding agreement that specified commitments for all member
countries, with the goal of completing an agreement in 2009.184 Achieving
unanimous approval of the common framework proved too difficult, and the
near failure of the 2009 negotiations in Copenhagen forced member countries
to abandon the top-down approach.185 Instead, the process resulted in the 2015
Paris Agreement that established a decentralized process that identified a
common emissions reduction goal, but relied on each country to specify
unilateral emission reduction targets and implement the policies to achieve the
targets.186 Article 6 of the Agreement authorizes multilateral market-based
mitigation strategies.187 These approaches could include linking separate
carbon pricing mechanisms or offset credits.188 Article 6 also authorizes
emissions pricing, such as carbon taxes, as an alternative to emission trading
systems.189 This new strategy allowed member countries to build upon

179

Letter to Members of the Senate on the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, 2001, 37 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 431, 444 (Mar. 13, 2001).
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See, e.g., Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and
Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1783–87 (2008) (describing how the CDM created incentives to
manufacture hydroflourocarbon—a potent greenhouse gas).
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See David A. Wirth, The International and Domestic Law of Climate Change: A Binding
International Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?, 39 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 515, 524 (2015)
(describing the parallel UNFCCC efforts to develop a new international agreement by 2009 and to
negotiate an extension of the Kyoto Protocol).
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States of America and Other Governments, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris
Agreement].
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Id. art. 6.2 (recognizing that some parties may use “internationally transferred mitigation
outcomes” to comply with nationally determined commitments).
188
Id. arts. 6.2, 6.4.
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Id. art. 6.8; Kelley Kizzier, Kelly Levin & Mandy Rambharos, What You Need to Know About
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, WORLD RES. INST. (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.wri.org/insights/whatyou-need-know-about-article-6-paris-agreement (“Article 6.8 establishes a work program for non-market
approaches, such as applying taxes to discourage emissions.”).
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established carbon markets, such as the EU Emission Trading Scheme, and
carbon taxes that were already in place or under development.190
Climate policy efforts in the United States followed a similar trajectory
from a single, top-down approach established by federal statute to a
decentralized approach established through state laws and the existing Clean Air
Act.191 The first major U.S. climate bills, introduced in Congress between 2003
and 2007, proposed national carbon markets covering most sectors of the
economy.192 Building upon these early bills, the American Clean Energy and
Security Act (commonly known as the Waxman-Markey bill) passed the U.S.
House of Representatives in 2009.193 The legislation included a GHG cap-and
trade system, including an emissions cap that declined on a specified schedule
between 2012 and 2050, specific rules for allowance allocation and auctioning,
mechanisms to protect energy-intensive industries whose competitiveness could
be jeopardized by higher energy prices resulting from the carbon price, offsets
provisions, and a market oversight regime.194 The companion bill stalled in the
U.S. Senate in 2010,195 effectively halting congressional efforts to implement
new federal legislation to mitigate climate change.
Similar to the international negotiations, the focus of climate policy in
the United States shifted away from a single, top-down federal climate bill
that would apply a common set of rules and obligations to most sectors of
the economy.196 Instead, the focus turned to state policies and the
environmental federalism framework of the Clean Air Act. States
implemented two carbon markets in the United States between 2009 and
2012—the California Cap-and-Trade Program that includes international
linkage to Canadian provincial carbon policies and the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (RGGI) that includes ten Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states
with two additional states in the process of joining the market.197 The Obama
administration sought to build upon these efforts with the promulgation of
the Clean Power Plan, a Clean Air Act rule targeting GHG emissions from
190
WORLD BANK GRP., STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2018 2431 (2018)
(summarizing recent developments and emerging trends in carbon pricing policies across the globe).
191
Monast, supra note 10, at 179–205 (describing the UNFCCC process and U.S. climate policy
developments through 2017).
192
For examples of early U.S. climate bills, see America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191,
110th Cong. (2007); Electric Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007, S. 317, 110th Cong. (2007); Safe
Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 1590, 110th Cong. (2007); Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th
Cong. (2003); Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005).
193
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
194
Id.
195
Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Effort for Climate Bill in Senate, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2010, at A15.
196
Monast, supra note 10, at 17679.
197
Welcome, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, www.rggi.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2021); VA.
CODE ANN. § 10.1-1330(B) (2021); Pa. Exec. Order No. 2019-07 As Amended (June 22, 2020),
https://www.oa.pa.gov/Policies/eo/Documents/2019-07.pdf (directing the state’s environmental agency
to begin a rulemaking process in order for Pennsylvania to participate in RGGI).
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198

existing power plants. That rule established emission targets for each
state, based on their respective electricity generation mix, and allowed states
to meet the targets using emissions trading.199 The U.S. Supreme Court
stayed the rule before states could begin implementation, and the Trump
administration subsequently replaced the rule with one that did not allow
emissions trading.200
C. Climate Policy Lessons for a Market-Based Plastics Pollution Policy
This Subpart builds upon these similarities and differences between
plastics pollution and GHG emissions, identifying lessons from domestic
and international climate policy developments that can inform the design of
plastics pollution policy, using the case of plastic packaging. The Subpart
identifies seven lessons from climate policy design that can help frame
policy options to address pollution from plastic packaging: defining the unit
of measurement, setting the price or pollution limit, choosing between price
certainty or quantity certainty, assigning compliance obligations, avoiding
pollution leakage, choosing between top-down or bottom-up frameworks,
and facilitating international policy linkage.
1. Defining the Unit of Measurement
Some environmental markets are relatively straightforward. For
example, the Acid Rain Program, established by the 1990 Clean Air Act
amendments, focuses on a single pollutant (sulfur dioxide or SO2), a single
category of sources (coal-fired power plants), and a particular geographic
area (eastern United States).201 The program established a cap on emissions
to avoid the environmental harm of acid rain—a problem that allows a
regional, as opposed to a source-specific, approach.202 Any coal-fired power
plant subject to the cap must have allowances, representing one ton of SO2,
for each ton emitted during the compliance period.203 The allowances are
fungible—there is a common unit of measurement (tons of SO2) and the

198

Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
199
Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electric Utility Generating
Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework
Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,015–16 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 62, 78).
200
West Virginia v. EPA, 577 U.S. 1126, 1126 (2016) (granting stay); Repeal of the Clean Power
Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating
Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
201
Acid Rain Program, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/acidrain/acid-rainprogram (July 22, 2021).
202
Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable
Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 577 (2001).
203
Id. at 584.
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204

policy explicitly authorizes emissions trading. Operators of coal-fired
power plants could install scrubbers to capture SO2, switch to lower sulfur
coal, continue emitting SO2 at the same level and purchase allowances,
reduce utilization of the plant, or replace the plant with generation that emits
less (or no) SO2.
Other environmental markets require translating environmental
attributes into a common metric. Here, carbon markets that target multiple
GHGs are informative.205 As noted previously, GHGs result from different
processes, have different sources, persist in the atmosphere for different
periods of time, and have different warming potential. The common metric
is the heat-trapping potential of each pollutant, using CO2 as the baseline.
According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency:
The United States primarily uses the 100-year GWP as a
measure of the relative impact of different GHGs. However,
the scientific community has developed a number of other
metrics that could be used for comparing one GHG to another.
These metrics may differ based on timeframe, the climate
endpoint measured, or the method of calculation.
For example, the 20-year GWP is sometimes used as an
alternative to the 100-year GWP. Just like the 100-year GWP
is based on the energy absorbed by a gas over 100 years, the
20-year GWP is based on the energy absorbed over 20 years.
This 20-year GWP prioritizes gases with shorter lifetimes,
because it does not consider impacts that happen more than 20
years after the emissions occur. Because all GWPs are
calculated relative to CO2, GWPs based on a shorter timeframe
will be larger for gases with lifetimes shorter than that of CO2,
and smaller for gases with lifetimes longer than CO2. For
example, for CH4, which has a short lifetime, the 100-year
GWP of 28–36 is much less than the 20-year GWP of 84–87.
For CF4, with a lifetime of 50,000 years, the 100-year GWP of
6630–7350 is larger than the 20-year GWP of 4880–4950.
204

Id. at 583–87.
Carbon markets are not the only example of translating different environmental attributes to a
common metric in order to facilitate trading. For example, wetlands mitigation banking focuses on
acreage with certain characteristics—soil types, habitat potential, proximity to a body of water, etc. The
environmental benefits of wetlands are also not fungible across geographic areas. Mitigating the loss of
a wetland in Watershed A by constructing a new wetland in Watershed B, for example, would not replace
the water filtration benefits in Watershed A. Furthermore, mitigation projects in different geographic
areas may fail to replace the destroyed habitat if the priority species are unable to migrate to the new area
or require different flora or fauna than is available in the new location. For a thorough analysis of the
various considerations involved in creating environmental markets, see James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl,
Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 611–13 (2000).
205
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Another alternate metric is the Global Temperature Potential
(GTP). While the GWP is a measure of the heat absorbed over
a given time period due to emissions of a gas, the GTP is a
measure of the temperature change at the end of that time
period (again, relative to CO2). The calculation of the GTP is
more complicated than that for the GWP, as it requires
modeling how much the climate system responds to increased
concentrations of GHGs (the climate sensitivity) and how
quickly the system responds (based in part on how the ocean
absorbs heat).206
Market-based plastics policies could incorporate either approach:
focusing on a single metric or translating multiple attributes into a common
metric. A key question is whether the primary concern is the volume of waste
or the makeup of the plastic. A market-based approach to plastics pollution
could focus on the volume of a particular type of plastics by, for example,
capping the volume of plastics that enter the stream of commerce at a local,
regional, national, or international level. Using volume as the metric would
allow for creation of a common commodity, such as a ton of plastic, but it
would not distinguish between the different uses and characteristics, nor
would it account for the different densities of plastics or their relative
contributions to pollution. The policy could apply to all plastics, certain
characteristics of plastics, or plastics used for a particular purpose such as
packaging or single-use bags.
Measurements for market-based plastics policies could create tradable
commodities based on the social cost or certain environmental impacts.
Alternatively, the policy could focus on the characteristics of the plastic
product, such as the percent of recycled content, single-use versus reusable,
or the ability to be recycled.207 Each approach has tradeoffs. Focusing solely
on recycled content of a plastic product, for example, creates incentives to
increase recycling and reduce demand for hydrocarbons as plastics
manufacturing feedstocks, but may not incentivize investment in
alternatives that address other environmental concerns such as
biodegradability. To put a finer point on it, the whale with plastics lodged in
its digestive system or the turtle with its beak caught in plastic packaging do
not care whether the plastic contains recycled content or not. Their concern
is the volume of plastic and how the waste is managed.
Climate and energy policy also demonstrates that policymakers may
implement multiple market-based policies that focus on different units of
206
Understanding Global Warming Potentials, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY: GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-potentials (Oct. 18, 2021).
207
See, e.g., Carriere & Beavers Horne, supra note 132, 10050–53 (proposing a market-based
approach for mandating minimum recycled content for single-use plastic packaging).

380

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:2

measurement may operate in parallel. California and the states participating
in the RGGI market also have clean energy policies that focus on other
attributes—e.g., the amount of renewable energy generation or clean
generation in the electricity mix.208
From a purely economic perspective, stacking these two policies may be
inefficient, as the clean energy standard limits the flexibility that would
otherwise be available under the cap-and-trade program.209 A certain
percentage of electricity generation must come from “clean” sources, rather
than the most efficient way to comply with the emissions cap. From an
environmental perspective, the stacking of different policies can
accommodate multiple policy goals.
2. Setting the Price or Pollution Limit
Policymakers may set the price using an estimate of the social cost, a
“target-consistent” approach that starts with a pollution reduction goal and
sets the price necessary to achieve the goal, or set at a level that is deemed
politically feasible.
Perhaps the best-known effort to calculate social costs of pollution is the
federal social cost of carbon (SCC), first developed by an interagency
working group (IWG) during the Obama administration.210 There, the IWG
considered changes in atmospheric emissions concentrations of carbon
dioxide, how the atmospheric emissions concentrations affect temperature
shifts, and how temperature shifts result in economic damages.211 The
resulting SCC is an average estimate of the annual marginal impacts caused

208
In addition to the state cap-and-trade program, California has a statutory mandate of 100% zero
carbon emissions by December 31, 2045. California Renewables Portfolio Standard Program: Emissions
of Greenhouse Gases, S. B. No. 100 § 5 (Cal. 2018). See also Renewable & Clean Energy Standards,
NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. (Sept. 2020), https://s3.amazonaws.com/ncsolarcen-prod/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/RPS-CES-Sept2020.pdf (showing that states participating in RGGI have also
implemented additional clean energy policies).
209
Neal J. Cabral, The Role of Renewable Portfolio Standards in the Context of a National Carbon
Cap-and-Trade Program, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 13, 14 (2007) (“Because RPS programs
seem largely intended to reduce carbon emissions, despite the fact that they do not actually target carbon
emissions, but rather fuel choice, their approach is a potentially inefficient command-and-control
mandate at odds with a market-based cap-and-trade program. Market-based cap-and-trade programs
hold, as their fundamental premise, that allowing the regulated community to determine its own solutions
to meet a mandatory emissions cap is far more cost-effective and more certain than a one-size fits all
series of command-and-control mandates, which instead set specific performance or technology
standards.”).
210
INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, U.S. GOV’T, TECHNICAL SUPPORT
DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
12866 1 (2010). The Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon was re-named the Interagency
Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases beginning in August 2016. See NAT’L ACADS. OF
SCIS., ENG’G & MED., VALUING CLIMATE DAMAGES: UPDATING ESTIMATION OF THE SOCIAL COST OF
CARBON DIOXIDE xvi (2017) (noting such change in the IWG).
211
INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, supra note 210, at 5.
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by an additional unit of carbon emissions, rather than an average estimate of
the average damages of all carbon emissions ever emitted.212
The dramatic difference between the Obama administration’s estimated
$45 per ton federal SCC for the year 2020 and the Trump administration’s
$1–$6 per ton SCC shows the inherent value choices associated with
determining the social cost of pollution.213 While both administrations used
the IWG’s integrated assessment models, the Trump administration
considered only domestic impacts of climate change, in contrast to the
Obama administration’s focus on domestic and international impacts.214 The
Trump administration also prescribed discount rates of 3 and 7 percent,
rather than a range of discount rates used to determine the SCC during the
Obama administration.215
Current plastics pricing policies do not attempt to quantify the full
marginal costs of plastics. Scholarship analyzing the social costs of plastics
evaluate impacts in different locations using different methodologies.216
There is no consensus about an approach for estimating social costs and
there is insufficient information about the full social and environmental
impacts of plastics pollution to inform the analysis.217

212
ILIANA PAUL, PETER HOWARD & JASON A. SCHWARTZ, INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, THE
SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES AND STATE POLICY: A FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS GUIDE
17 (2017).
213
Jason Bordoff, Trump vs. Obama on the Social Cost of Carbon–And Why It Matters, WALL ST.
J.: EXPERTS BLOG (Nov. 15, 2017, 1:04 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2017/11/15/trump-vsobama-on-the-social-cost-of-carbon-and-why-it-matters/; INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST
OF GREENHOUSE GASES, U.S. GOV’T, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE
SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 4
tbl.ES-1 (2016); OFF. OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, OFF. OF ATMOSPHERIC PROGRAMS &
OFF. OF POL’Y, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE REVIEW OF THE
CLEAN POWER PLAN: PROPOSAL 44 tbl.3-7 (2017) [hereinafter REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS].
214
Sarah Krakoff & Shannon Roesler, Environmental Justice and Environmental Sustainability:
Beyond Environment and Beyond Law, in Environmental Law. Disrupted., 49 ENV’T L. REP. 10038,
10050–51 (2019) (“[T]he Administration's new $1-$7/ton social cost of carbon completely ignores the
costs of global warming outside the United States, an isolationist approach to a quintessentially global
problem.”).
215
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 213, at 44 tbl.3-7; Katherine A. Trisolini,
Efficiency Gatekeepers, the Social Cost of Carbon, and Post-Trump Climate Change Regulation, 91
TEMP. L. REV. 261, 302–05 (2019).
216
See, e.g., Lau et al., supra note 4, at 1 (“The lower-bound estimate of the economic impact on
costs of plastic pollution to fishing, tourism, and shipping have been estimated at $13 billion annually.”);
Beaumont et al., supra note 5, at 193 (2019) (estimating that the economic cost of the impact of marine
plastic on marine natural capital would be between $3,300 and $33,000 in 2011 dollars); Roy Brouwer
et al., The Social Costs of Marine Litter Along European Coasts, 138 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 38, 38
(2017) (evaluating “the social costs of marine debris washed ashore and litter left behind by beach visitors
along different European coasts”).
217
See, e.g, KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 82 (“[T]here is limited knowledge about the (internal
or external) costs of plastic bag pollution as well as other environmental and social costs of consumption
that are not included in the price that the retailers pay for plastic bags, so it is not possible to set the price
for plastic bags at the marginal social cost.”); Stephanie L. Wright & Frank J. Kelly, Plastic and Human
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Furthermore, there are numerous challenges with quantifying the social
cost of plastics pollution.218 Reliable data about health and ecological
impacts of plastics pollution is not available. Even if the data were available,
a social cost calculus that prioritizes anthropocentric impacts may severely
undervalue the benefits of mitigating plastics pollution. A robust SCC that
accounts for uncertainties regarding discount rates and includes both
domestic and international impacts is an effective metric for designing
climate policy.219 Unabated GHG emissions pose existential threats to
human life, and therefore the social cost of those harms produces an
emissions cost that would have an immediate impact on energy production
and consumption.220 Energy resources with little or no GHG emissions
would be more competitive, and a high emissions cost should drive
investment in developing additional lower-emitting resources.221 The impact
of plastics pollution may have significant economic effects on some sectors,
such as local tourism or fisheries. Compared to climate change, however,
plastics pollution has far less of a direct effect on services and society.222
Many of the impacts of plastics pollution affect biodiversity and ecosystems,
complicating efforts to quantify the social costs of plastics pollution.223
It is not necessary to pinpoint a social cost in order for pollution pricing
to reduce the impacts of plastics, but pollution pricing should increase the
cost of a plastic product which could make alternatives to plastic more cost
effective. The challenges and uncertainty with calculating an SCC led the
United Kingdom (UK) to shift from a “damage cost estimate[]” approach to
a target-consistent approach to assessing the value of GHG abatement.224
The target-consistent approach estimates of the abatement costs are
Health: A Micro Issue?, 51 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 6634, 6634 (2017) (noting that “microplastics and human
health is an emerging field”).
218
See supra text accompanying notes 211–215.
219
Geoffrey Giller, The Social Cost of Carbon Is Still the Best Way to Evaluate Climate Policy,
YALE SCH. OF THE ENV’T (Aug. 23, 2021), https://environment.yale.edu/news/article/social-cost-ofcarbon-still-best-way-to-evaluate-climate-policy.
220
William D. Nordhaus, Revisiting the Social Cost of Carbon, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS.
1518, 1518 (2017) (“The most important single economic concept in the economics of climate change is
the social cost of carbon . . . .”).
221
KEOHANE & OLMSTEAD, supra note 135, at 17984.
222
Plastic Waste and Climate Change—What’s the Connection?, WORLDWIDE WILDLIFE FUND
AUSTL. (June 30, 2021), https://www.wwf.org.au/news/blogs/plastic-waste-and-climate-change-whatsthe-connection#gs.cfx60l (explaining the connection between plastic waste and climate change in an
interview with Kerri Major, Engagement Manager of Partnerships and Innovation at WWF Australia).
223
See Beaumont et al., supra note 5, at 194 (finding that even “conservatively” calculating the
economic impact of ocean plastics pollution costs $3,300 to $33,000 per tonne of marine plastic per
year); Tamara S. Galloway, Matthew Cole & Ceri Lewis, Interactions of Microplastic Debris Throughout
the Marine Ecosystem, 1 NATURE ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 0116-1 passim (2017) (discussing the
ecological impacts of plastic on marine life).
224
U.K. DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON VALUATION IN UK POLICY APPRAISAL:
A REVISED APPROACH 21 (2009).
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necessary to meet specific emissions reduction targets. Calculating the
price requires comparing emissions projections under a business-as-usual
scenario with the emissions reductions goal. This gap between
business-as-usual scenarios and the target emission levels represents the
emission reductions needed to meet the target goals in each of the years.226
Policymakers then use cost curves to estimate the price necessary to achieve
the reductions.227
A target-based approach for plastics, therefore, could be more effective
than attempting to base policy on a social cost analysis. The target could
focus on an amount of pollution abatement or a price that produces revenue
to develop alternative products and improve waste management programs.
3. Choosing Between Price Certainty or Quantity Certainty
The concern with climate change is the total atmospheric concentration
of GHGs and policy measures often focus on specific metrics such as
limiting the average global temperature increase to no more than two degrees
Celsius.228 The scientific data that the severity of climate change impacts
will increase as the concentration increases, and concerns about an
atmospheric tipping point that could result in irreversible global impacts,
have led many policymakers and stakeholders to prioritize quantity
certainty.229 Many stakeholders and policymakers also viewed carbon
markets as the more politically-viable option.230
225
Noah Kaufman et al., A Near-Term to Net Zero Alternative to the Social Cost of Carbon for
Setting Carbon Prices, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1010, 1010–11 (2020).
226
U.K. DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 224, at 1518.
227
Id. at 17.
228
See Paris Agreement, supra note 186, art 2.1(a) (stating that the Paris Agreement aims to “hold[]
the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and [to]
[pursue] efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”).
229
CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., Cap and Trade Basics, https://www.c2es.org/content/capand-trade-basics (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (a cap-and-trade program “may be the preferable policy
when a jurisdiction has a specified emissions target”); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-andTrade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 293, 298 (2008) (“Overall, a capand-trade system provides certainty regarding emissions from regulated sources because aggregate
emissions from all regulated entities cannot exceed the total number of allowances.”). Although
emissions certainty is a key trait of a cap-and-trade program, it is possible to increase emissions certainty
through a carbon tax. See, e.g., BRIAN MURRAY, WILLIAM A. PIZER & CHRISTINA REICHERT, NICHOLAS
INST. FOR ENV’T POL’Y SOLS., POLICY BRIEF NI PB 16-03, INCREASING EMISSIONS CERTAINTY UNDER
A CARBON TAX 2–4 (2016) (discussing options to incorporate emissions certainty into carbon tax
policies, including tax adjustments, regulatory backstops, and spending tax revenue to reduce emissions);
Katharine Hayhoe et al., Our Changing Climate, in II IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 100, 120 (David Reidmiller et al. eds., 2018)
(discussing threats of a tipping point).
230
See, e.g., Charles Frank, Pricing Carbon: A Carbon Tax or Cap-and-Trade?, BROOKINGS (Aug.
12, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2014/08/12/pricing-carbon-a-carbon-tax-orcap-and-trade (discussing opposition to carbon taxes and the political viability of cap-and-trade markets
for electric power plants).
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The type of certainty for plastics policy depends on the goals, as discussed
previously in this Subpart.231 Achieving specific reductions in the amount of
plastic production, the amount of non-recycled plastic (post-consumption), or
the total volume of plastic production or consumption would each call for a
quantitative-based approach. Similar to climate policy, a tax on plastics may
incentivize different behaviors depending on the amount of the tax, the cost of
alternatives, and the ability to pass costs through to consumers. However, it
would not ensure a reduction in the volume of plastic production,
consumption, or waste.
Economic and environmental certainty are not the only determining
factors that guide the choice between pollution taxes and cap-and-trade
markets. For example, trading may allow entities producing plastics with
higher social benefit to purchase allowances and continue producing.232
Alternatively, a market- or tax-based program could exempt certain types of
plastics altogether.233 Administrative and monitoring costs may also
influence the policy instrument choice. A pollution tax, for example, does
not require trading platforms. Nor does it raise concerns about market
manipulation, requiring a potentially costly government program to monitor
market transactions.234
4. Assigning Compliance Obligations
Assigning compliance obligations for unilateral market-based plastics
policies could be particularly complex. Climate policies require compliance
by upstream sources of emissions, such as power plants, refineries, and
manufacturers. 235 This applies the policy to fewer sources and those sources
are already subject to multiple regulatory requirements, including some who
are covered by market-based programs. It is easier for regulators to monitor
these sources and take enforcement action if necessary.
Policymakers could place the compliance obligation with manufacturers
of plastic resins, manufacturers of plastic products, or retailers selling the
231

See supra text accompanying notes 165166.
See, e.g., Stavins, supra note 229, at 298 (explaining that, under an emissions market, “the cap
is placed only on aggregate emissions and imposes no particular limits on emissions from any given firm
or source”). This compliance flexibility has been the source of significant critiques of emissions markets.
For an example of such a critique, see Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate
Change Policy, 38 ENV’T L. REP. 10287, 10301 (2008).
233
For example, the RGGI market exempts electric generators that are not capable of producing a
minimum of 25 megawatts. Elements of RGGI, REG’ L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi
.org/program-overview-and-design/elements (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). Similarly, the RGGI program
only applies to electricity generation. Id.
234
Jonas Monast, Climate Change and Financial Markets: Regulating the Trade Side of Cap and Trade,
40 ENV’T L. REP. 10051, 10061 (2010) (evaluating options to oversee carbon markets as financial markets).
235
This is the approach taken with the California Cap-and-Trade Program, the RGGI, the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme, and the Acid Rain Program. See supra notes 201, 230 and accompanying
text; infra text accompanying notes 256262.
232
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plastic products to customers. The choice would depend, at least in part,
upon the unit of measurement and the geographic scope of the policy. For
example, most bag fees apply at the retail level. It would be difficult for
retailers that sell multiple products with plastic packaging to verify the
percent of virgin content in, or recyclability of, each product. Upstream
manufacturers would be better suited to do so, but those manufacturers may
not be located in a region with the compliance obligation.
5. Avoiding Pollution Leakage
The term “leakage” can have different meanings in the context of
plastics policy. Plastics leakage can refer to the plastic waste discharged into
the environment.236 Leakage may also refer to product leakage, whereby a
policy targeting a certain type of plastic can lead to increased use of
alternative products that are not subject to the policy.237 A third type of
leakage that can arise with plastics policy is an increase in pollution in a
sector or a location that is not covered by a pollution abatement policy.238
The primary leakage concerns with climate policy are emissions leakage
across geography or leakage across sectors of the economy.239 Because
GHGs are globally-mixing, a policy that is limited to one jurisdiction could
cause emitters to relocate or make polluters in other jurisdictions more
cost-competitive.240 The most straightforward response to leakage in these
contexts is to design a policy with as broad a geographic and sectoral scope
as possible.241
A border adjustment is a partial solution for international leakage
concerns, as it can apply the compliance cost of a domestic policy to
imported products.242 This accounts for emissions associated with domestic
consumption but does not apply to products sold in other countries.243 If
236
KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 14. This use of the term “leakage” is not limited to plastics
policy. See, e.g., Sudhanshu Pandey et al., Satellite Observations Reveal Extreme Methane Leakage from
a Natural Gas Well Blowout, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 26376, 26376 (2019) (referring to methane
escaping from natural gas wells as “leakage”).
237
KARASIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 13 (noting that “consumption of alternatives to plastics
targeted by a policy . . . is a key challenge”).
238
Stavins, supra note 229, at 311 (defining leakage as “market adjustments resulting from a
regulation [that] lead to increased emissions from unregulated sources outside the cap that partially offset
reductions under the cap”).
239
Id. Applying a carbon price to electricity, but not to heating fuels, is a situation that could cause
leakage across economic sectors. Increased emissions from heating fuels could negate some of the
emission reductions that may occur in the electricity sector. Id.
240
Id.
241
Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967 (2007) (arguing that emissions leakage is “perhaps [the] most important”
disadvantage of subglobal climate policies).
242
See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 768(a)(1)(E)
(2009) (applying a carbon border adjustment on imported products).
243
Id.
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those other countries do not have climate policies, or have less stringent
policies, global emissions caused by the product could still rise.
Domestic price focused on consumption can apply to plastics produced
domestically or imported. Price on production could apply directly to
domestic producers and apply as a border adjustment for imports. The
importance of leakage, therefore, turns on the purpose of the policy. If the
purpose is to decrease local pollution or to incentivize the use of alternatives
for domestic use, then domestic policy may be enough. If the purpose is to
address any of the collective action problems identified in Part I, the policy
should account for leakage.244
If the primary concern is the product rather than the pollution, it is easier
for a country to apply a price to imports. That may reduce competitiveness
of virgin plastics within the country and create revenue to fund R&D. It does
not necessarily impact total production, so there is still an argument for
multinational coordination.
Regarding sectoral leakage, a pollution price is agnostic about
production that is not subject to the policy. For plastics, this could also apply
to concerns about product leakage. If the policy aims at a particular type of
plastic, it would be possible for manufacturers to develop alternative
products that are not subject to the policy. These alternatives could have
more serious environmental impacts than the products they replaced.
6. Choosing Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Governance
The focus on a uniform, legally-binding agreement with uniform
obligations almost derailed the international climate negotiations.245
Achieving unanimity proved to be unrealistic, with uniform commitments a
particular sticking point.246 The United States remained unwilling to accept
the Kyoto Protocol’s distinction between developed and developing
countries.247 Numerous developing countries argued that they should not
face the same emission constraints as countries like the United States, which
are responsible for the majority of GHGs currently affecting the climate and
that had already benefitted economically from those emissions.248

244
For example, the United States is a direct source of plastic pollution and the second largest global
exporter of plastic waste. Lavender Law et al., supra note 57, at 1.
245
See supra Part III.B. See also David G. Victor, What the Framework Convention on Climate
Change Teaches Us About Cooperation on Climate Change, 4 POL. & GOVERNANCE 133, 134 (2016)
(discussing the challenges of a legally binding, universal agreement).
246
Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem, 104 AM. J.
INT’L L. 230, 233 (2010).
247
Id.
248
Id. at 232 (“[D]eveloping countries continue[d] to argue, as they [had] done since the
negotiations began back in 1991, that they are not historically responsible for the climate change problem,
have less capacity to respond to it, and should therefore not be expected to undertake specific
international commitments to reduce emissions.”).
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In the aftermath of the 2009 UNFCCC Conference of Parties,
international negotiators shifted away from the preferred top-down, uniform
agreement and embraced the heterogeneous, bottom-up framework that
countries ultimately adopted in the 2015 Paris Agreement.249 The success of
the UNFCCC process now depends upon member countries’ willingness to
meet their “common but differentiated responsibilities,” including
increasing the stringency of their respective commitments.250 Negotiators
working toward a regional or global plastics pollution agreement face a
similar set of choices.251
A key question for policymakers is whether the environmental and
economic benefits of uniformity outweigh the challenges of reaching
agreement or the risk that achieving broad agreement would result in
decreased stringency of the policy.252 A single set of rules may be
economically efficient, prevent forum shopping by firms with compliance
obligations, and provide a platform for adjusting the policy over time. It could
also expose the policy to political vulnerabilities if a country representing a
large source of the problem withdraws from the agreement, such as the Trump
administration’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.253
7. Facilitating Program Linkage
There are numerous examples of carbon markets linking with one
another. For example, California designed its carbon market while also
engaging with other Western states regarding a regional carbon market, and
state regulations specify requirements for market linkage.254 The California
market linked its market with Quebec’s in 2013, and briefly linked with
Ontario’s carbon market in 2018.255 The RGGI operates as a linked system

249
Charles F. Sabel & David G. Victor, Governing Global Problems Under Uncertainty: Making
Bottom-Up Climate Policy Work, 144 CLIMATIC CHANGE 15, 16 (2017) (“The top-down world has long
been assumed as the first best strategy for solving serious global problems.”). Climate policy in the
United States followed a similar trajectory from the initial focus on top-down to bottom-up approaches.
Monast, supra note 10, at 185–205.
250
Paris Agreement, supra note 186, art. 4.
251
RAUBENHEIMER & URHO, supra note 9, at 35–36.
252
Victor, supra note 245, at 134.
253
Lisa Friedman, U.S. Quits Paris Climate Agreement: Questions and Answers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/climate/paris-climate-agreement-trump.html. The
United States subsequently rejoined the agreement after President Biden took office. Presidential
Statement on Acceptance of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change on Behalf of the United States,
2021 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Jan. 20, 2021).
254
Monast, supra note 10, at 191–92; CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12894 (West 2021) (listing the findings
that the governor must make before California’s carbon market may link with another jurisdiction).
255
Program Linkage, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/cap-andtrade-program/program-linkage (last visited Nov. 21, 2021). The market linkage between California and
Ontario ended when Ontario repealed its cap-and-trade program. Id.
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256

rather than a single, top-down market. Each state participating in RGGI
adopts its own legislation and regulations that allow the state to participate
in the market. The individual state laws are consistent with the RGGI model
rule, including an emissions cap, trading rules, and tracking system
requirements.257 The result is a common set of rules for the regional market,
rather than a single, top-down program.258
The preceding examples focus on existing linked carbon markets that
coordinated with prospective partners while implementing the market.
Jurisdictions acting unilaterally may also facilitate future linkage, but their
initial policy design choices may affect whether linkage is possible. The
California Cap-and-Trade Program and RGGI are not compatible without
significant changes on the part of one or both programs. California’s market
covers multiple sectors of the economy and includes specific rules for
domestic and international carbon offset credits.259 The RGGI market, on the
other hand, only covers emissions from the electricity sector and includes a
different set of rules and restrictions for carbon offsets.260
Policymakers in different jurisdictions may streamline future linkage by
adopting common market design choices. For example, the Clean Power Plan,
the Obama-era Clean Air Act rule limiting GHG emissions from existing
power plants, included “trading ready” options that identified regulations a
state could implement that would facilitate trading with other states.261

256
The states participating in RGGI agree to their respective emission reduction obligations and
codify a common set of market rules rather than opting into a single market system. Wiseman & Osofsky,
supra note 163, at 220–21. This scheme avoids Compact Clause vulnerabilities. Notably:

The states created a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization to develop and support this
initiative. This organization has no ‘regulatory or enforcement authority,’ as states
that are part of the initiative retain independent rulemaking and enforcement authority
and simply adopt model rules to implement RGGI, but it conducts much of the
technical and operational work required to make RGGI run smoothly.
Id. at 221.
257
For example, Virginia is in the process of joining RGGI. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1330 (2021); 9
VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-140-6010 (establishing a CO2 Budget Trading Program).
258
For a compilation of state laws and regulations for the RGGI program, see State Statutes &
Regulations, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-anddesign/state-regulations (last visited Nov. 21, 2021).
259
See California Cap and Trade, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS.,
https://www.c2es.org/content/california-cap-and-trade (last visited Sept. 16, 2021) (summarizing the
California carbon market); Compliance Offset Protocols, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/ourwork/programs/compliance-offset-program/compliance-offset-protocols (last visited Sept. 16, 2021)
(summarizing the registration process for offset projects and providing links for further information).
260
Elements of RGGI, supra note 233.
261
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,735 (Oct. 23, 2015) (repealed 2019).
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Alternatively, a jurisdiction may incorporate design choices of markets that
are already operating.262
Linking a tax-based approach avoids many of the complications that
arise with pollution markets. Jurisdictions can apply a different tax to the
same types of plastics or apply the same tax to different plastics. The
differences would not interfere with a single jurisdiction’s policies, but it
could lead to different behaviors among firms. A tax on plastics production
could incentivize manufacturing to relocate to areas with low or no pollution
tax. Similarly, different taxes focused on a product (e.g., packaging) or on
post-consumer waste could incentivize the sale of certain plastics in different
places. The impact of the product-based tax or post-consumer waste tax
would depend on the levels of the tax and the number of jurisdictions with
taxes. If few jurisdictions adopt the tax, or the majority of jurisdictions with
taxes choose negligible prices, the policies may have little impact on overall
plastics production. Choosing common pollution prices and covered entities
could help avoid the incentives for relocation and help ensure effectiveness
of the policies.
CONCLUSION
Like climate change, a market-based policy response to the plastics
pollution problem would be more efficient, and possibly more effective, if
there were a broad regional or global response that placed the compliance
obligation on upstream producers of plastic resins or manufacturers of plastic
products. This would address concerns about production leakage and create
consistent incentives and regulatory requirements for producers. However, a
global approach could suffer from the same limitations as the global efforts to
address climate change, particularly the risk of a lack of consensus and
pressures to make the policy less stringent and, thus, less effective.
The nature of plastics pollution allows more flexibility with the policy
response than do globally mixing pollutants like GHGs. An effective global
agreement may be preferable, but it is possible to achieve local and regional
benefits even if other countries refuse to act. Also, although plastic pollution
is an ever-growing problem, there is not a tipping point that could result in
irreversible global impacts, reducing the importance of policy uniformity.
Different countries could therefore pursue different responses. They could
also design programs that could link to one another. Here, a plastics tax
could be attractive, as linking would require agreement on issues such as
pricing, monitoring, and enforcement, but would not require the complex
262
California regulations and European Union Directives provide guidance for jurisdictions seeking
to link with their respective carbon markets. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12894 (West 2021); Directive
2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 Amending Directive
2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of
the Community, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 63, 64; International Carbon Market, EUR. COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/markets_en (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
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rules necessary to facilitate multijurisdictional markets. Alternatively,
carbon taxes could operate in parallel with one another, with import tariffs
leveling the playing field for domestic firms. Differences in price and scope
could affect firms’ behavior, but the benefits of unilateral action may
outweigh the inefficiencies or potential for production leakage.
Policymakers could design pricing policies to complement other
measures to reduce plastics pollution. For example, the revenue could fund
research into alternative products, new waste management technologies, or
consumer incentives. Revenue could also support cleanup efforts and
economic development in areas suffering from plastics pollution.

